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It is not known when and how Parsi first met Javad Zarif, Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations (2002-2007) in New York City.  Zarif currently is Iran’s Foreign Minister.

Their association dates back at least to 2003, according to a report NIAC sent to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).  In the document, NIAC stated it had a relationship with Zarif “due to personal contacts between Dr. Zarif and NIAC’s Acting President, Trita Parsi.”[1]

Emails and dates of meetings between Parsi and Zarif were made public during the defamation lawsuit filed by Parsi and NIAC against Daioleslam Seif Hassan.  In the discovery process, Parsi was required to hand over all of his calendar entries.  For 2006, there was a five-month gap in which there are no entries.

In the available emails, both Parsi and Zarif used private email addresses to communicate.  Zarif’s address was [email protected]  The domain name, 141.com, was registered in 1996 at eName Technology, located in Xiamen, China.  The company conceals registration information, which likely accounts for its many links to illicit domain names.

Parsi communicated with Zarif from his university email account ([email protected]) and later his personal address ([email protected]) rather than his NIAC address ([email protected]).  Parsi also used a private email account when communicating with Siamak Namazi.

The emails and meeting dates made public are from 2006 and 2007.  While obvious gaps exist in the communications, it’s possible to gain an understanding of Parsi’s relationship with Zarif and their collaboration on political issues.

Parsi traveled to New York City numerous times to meet Zarif.  Had their relationship been casual and their discussions cursory, it’s unlikely Parsi would have made so many trips to New York.  Meeting together facilitated their ability to discuss issues in detail, as well as ensured their confidentiality.

Below are the dates of emails exchanged between Parsi and Zarif and known meetings in New York City in 2006-07:

 

Date	Event	Date	Event
March 16, 2006	email	October 12, 2006	meeting in NYC
March 28, 2006	meeting in NYC	October 26, 2006	3 emails
March 29, 2006	2 emails	February 6, 2007	2 emails
March 30, 2006	email	February 16, 2007	2 emails
May 19, 2006	email	February 23, 2007	meeting in NYC
June 1, 2006	likely meeting in NYC	April 3, 2007	meeting in NYC
August 23, 2006	email	April 16, 2007	meeting in NYC
September 28, 2006	email	October 12, 2007	meeting in NYC
October 10, 2006	email

 

Parsi’s email to Zarif on March 16, 2006 confirms their personal relationship.  Parsi updated Zarif on his graduate studies and indicated he wanted to get together, mentioning minimal details.  In the email, Parsi stated:

Dear Ambassador,

I hope this message finds you well.  I wanted to let you know that I have finished my PhD on Israel and Iran and am currently writing a book on this topic for Yale University Press.

I wanted to see if I could visit you in NY later in March or April to discuss some of the latest developments on this issue.

Very much look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Trita Parsi[2]
Twelve days after forwarding the email, Parsi met Zarif in New York City (March 28).  Parsi thanked Zarif for the meeting.  From the email, it is evident they talked about more than Iran-Israel relations:

Thank you so much for the meeting yesterday.  I need to clarify a few points before I discuss the spring03 issue.  Would you prefer to do this per email or should I call you?  tp[3]

The “spring03 issue” refers to a document Zarif provided to Parsi.   In the spring of 2003, the US received from the Swiss Embassy in Tehran a proposal dubbed the “Grand Bargain.”  The document presented a “roadmap” to negotiate policy issues between Iran and the US.  Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said US intelligence investigated the overture and did not find “consonance” with face-to-face discussions with “high-ranking Iranian intelligence people.”[4]  The US State Department had seen “dozens of such proposals in the past” that were without merit and it was skeptical of the document from Iran.[5]  As a result, it was not given much weight.

A second version of the Grand Bargain document, known as the “American version,” supposedly  originated in the US instead of Iran.  As the story goes, it was transmitted received by Sadegh Kharazi, Iranian Ambassador to France, on April 27, 2003.  The document was brought to the attention of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, who then “asked Ambassador Zarif to make amendments to the proposal and return it.”[6]  The exact source of the document was unknown, although Iran is said to believe it “most likely” originated from Armitage.[7]

Returning to the emails, about an hour after sending the thank-you message to Zarif, Parsi forwarded a second email to clarify issues discussed during their New York meeting.  Parsi’s questions refer to the American version of the Grand Bargain document:

1. Who was the deliverer of the proposal and how was it communicated that it was from Amitage?
2. In your view, what prompted the US to make such a proposal at that time?
3. Exactly when was the proposal sent to you?  Did you receive it directly or was it first sent to another Iranian officer?
4. Did you respond to it directly or after consultations with Tehran?
5. When was a response sent to DC and how?   Directly or through middle man?  If later, who?
6. What was [the] response from [the] US side?  Did the US communicate anything at all?  If not, why not?
7. What was the reaction to Iran to the American response/non-response?  How did it affect Iranian perceptions of American intentions?
8. How should I refer to you when talking to my contact?
9. Do you want me to give the contact a quote from you upfront or later?[8]

 

Given the questions above, it is clear that Parsi was confused by the document provided by Zarif.  Parsi wanted details on the document’s pedigree and guidance on related issues.  Parsi’s question, “How should I refer to you when talking to my contact?” indicates Parsi will be meeting with a contact about the document from Zarif.

Parsi’s next question, “Do you want me to give the contact a quote from you upfront or later?” would indicate the contact is with the media.  That Zarif would allow Parsi to provide a quote is evidence the two men are closely associated and the Ambassador’s trust in Parsi to speak on his behalf.

Zarif responded to Parsi’s email later the same day, stating, “Either way is fine.  I saw your interview on BBC.  Great.”  This email confirms their collaboration and the Ambassador’s eagerness to work together with Parsi.  The next day, on March 30, 2006, Zarif forwarded another email to Parsi about the “spring03 issue”:

I guess we need to talk.

I was not the Iranian official who received the proposal.  I got it from the Foreign Minister, who asked me to comment and prepare a reply, and told me that it had come through an intermediary from Armitage.

The claims and counter claims about the source of the proposals and motivations of intermediaries remain a mystery for me.

What I think is important is the fact that Iran was prepared.[9]

In the days that followed, Parsi made contact with Gareth Porter, an anti-war activist who regularly publishes articles sympathetic to Iran on the website “antiwar.com.”[10]  Parsi briefed him about the Grand Bargain issue and provided him with the America version of the document.  On May 24, 2006, Inter Press Service (IPS) distributed a news story by Porter about the Grand Bargain.  He wrote:

“Trita Parsi, a specialist on Iranian foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies who provided the document to IPS, says he got it from an Iranian official earlier this year but is not at liberty to reveal the source.”[11] [emphasis added]

Parsi confirmed in a deposition that he received the copy of the Grand Bargain document from Zarif.  In the deposition he was asked:

Who is the Iranian official you mention in this article [by Garth Porter] that gave you the document but who you were not at liberty to say?[12]

Parsi responded:

This is Ambassador Javad Zarif who gave me a version of a document that I already had, and I had shown that I had it to him.[13]

That Parsi previously may have obtained a version of the Grand Bargain document is irrelevant.  Of importance is the timing of the decision to make the issue public and release of the document.

In January 2006, Iran had begun again to enrich uranium.  In response, the UN Security Council started discussions on imposing economic sanctions against Iran.  Facing the possibility of new sanctions, Iran unexpectedly announced on March 18 it would accept an offer for dialogue with the US regarding issues in Iraq.  Several months earlier, Zalmay Khalilzad, US ambassador to Iraq, had received the go-ahead from President Bush to engage in direct talks with Iran on subduing militants in Iraq and securing the country.

Iran’s sudden interest in talks with the US was viewed as a ruse by many, including The Washington Post, which said, “By drawing the Bush administration into talks about Iraq, the Iranians give themselves a shot at splintering or distracting the fragile coalition [UN Security Council members] that may be forming in New York.”[14]  In Tehran, officials were already indicating that potential talks with the US would likely expand to nuclear issues in Iran.

By publicly releasing the Grand Bargain document and background story, credence was given to Iran’s overture that it was serious in entering into a dialogue with the US.  Parsi directly colluded in this process, thereby bolstering Iran’s propaganda campaign to influence US policymakers, in a strategy the mullahs’ hoped would derail new economic sanctions.

During this same period, Parsi and Porter agreed to work together on a venture called the Iranian Negotiation Project.  On May 12, 2006, Parsi sent an email to Porter with an attached Excel spreadsheet with budget details about the project. The proposed budget was $99,810.  As Project Director, Parsi would be paid $4,600/month and Porter, a Communication Advisor, would receive $5,000/month.  The Project was to extend for nine months, from June 2006 through March 2007.

Parsi’s email to Porter is the only document available about the Project.  Its goal appears to dovetail Iran’s objective to convince US officials to enter negotiations and sideline further sanctions.

Parsi and Porter collaborated on two additional occasions.  On June 21, 2006, Parsi, Porter and David Robinson of Pax Christi were the featured speakers at a Congressional Progressive Caucus meeting titled, “Would War with Iran Help or Hurt US National Security?”

On July 24, 2006, NIAC released an issue brief co-authored by Parsi and Porter on Iran’s involvement in the War in Lebanon.  Regarding the Negotiation Project, it appears to have never gotten off the ground.

Returning to the emails between Parsi and Zarif, on May 19 Parsi contacted Zarif to request his participation in a conference on Capitol Hill.  Parsi additionally mentioned his work with the Strategic Assessments Initiative (SAI), a nonprofit organization that provided “legal and policy advice and guidance to parties negotiating in conflict and post-conflict situations.”[15]

Parsi said he and SAI were working “with regional governments to enhance the feasibility of a new Persian Gulf security arrangement.”

In particular, we will be working in DC to create stronger support for such an arrangement.  Clearly, we need to work with the regional governments, and I would like to hold some preliminary talks with you about this, if possible.[16]

The email demonstrates Parsi’s interest in further collaboration with Zarif on another foreign policy issue.  Parsi said in the email he would be in New York on June 1 and wanted to speak with Zarif on the above issues at that time, if possible.

On August 23, 2006, Parsi sent another email to Zarif, this time about a new Iranian proposal to resolve the standoff over its nuclear program.  Parsi wrote:

Hope all is well and that you are back from Tehran.  Would love to get a chance to see the proposal or to understand more what it entails.  If it is substantial, then certainly members of Congress may find it a reasonable offer, even if the White House doesn’t.  tp[17]

In late September 2006, Parsi emailed a copy of an AP news article to Zarif about John Bolton, then US Ambassador to the UN.  The article said the US Senate would likely not vote on Bolton’s nomination, which would mean he would have to leave the UN at the end of his recess appointment.  Bolton is an outspoken opponent of Iran’s mullahs and its nuclear program.  His likely departure from the UN was good news for Iran and Parsi wanted to share the information with Zarif.

The following months, Parsi acted as an intermediary to set up meetings between Zarif and members of Congress.  In an October 25, 2006 email, Parsi said, “happy to hear you will meet with [Congressman] Gilchrest and potentially [Congressman] Leach.”  He continued:

There are many more that are interested in a meeting, including many respectable Democrats.  Due to various reasons, they will contact you directly….There large goal is to meet with Iranian elected parliamentarians.[18]

Parsi concluded his email with an offer to assist the ambassador.  “Let me know if I can be any further help,” he says.

On the following day, Parsi sent an email to Zarif to inquire if he had been contacted by Congressman Maurice Hinchey.  Zanif got back to Parsi, saying “Hinchey has not called yet.  I met him a few years ago.”[19]

Zarif forwards a second email to Parsi about a resolution and statements by Lavrov.  About the meetings with members of Congress, the Ambassador says, “I am always open to these meetings.  Your help is always welcome.  I leave the modalities to your discretion.”

Zarif concluded his tenure as Ambassador to the UN in 2007.  In an email in early February 2007, Parsi said he was saddened by the news of Zarif’s return to Tehran.  “Would love to get a chance to see you one more time before you leave,” Parsi said.  “Will coordinate with Mrs. Kamali to get on your schedule.”[20]

Parsi informed Zarif about a book John Limbert was writing on Iranian negotiation behavior.  He said Limbert wanted to interview him.  Minutes later Parsi dispatched another email to Javid, asking “can I forward him your private email and have you two settle details.”[21] [emphasis added]

Ten days later, Parsi asked Zarif if he had time for a meeting the following Friday.  He continued:

I am having a meeting with [Congressmen Wayne] Gilchrest and [Gregory] Meeks, and they asked for our assistance in getting some communication going between the parliamentarians.[22] [emphasis added]

The email is yet another example of Parsi’s collaboration with the Iranian ambassador.

There is a four-month gap in emails between Parsi and Zarif.  On June 14, 2007, Parsi sent the outgoing ambassador the following message:

Salaam – yes, they are all well.  Thank you.  And you?  I hope all is well.  Yes, I will attend the good bye party, and wanted to see if I also could schedule a meeting with you and the [new] Ambassador that same day to follow up on previous discussions?  tp[23]

Before Zarif departed from New York City, Parsi had two meetings with his top assistant, Gholam Hossein Mohammadnia, presumably to ensure a continuation of Parsi’s working relationship with the Iranian mission at the UN.  On October 12, 2007, Parsi met the new Iranian ambassador to the UN, Mohammad Khazaei.

Parsi claimed in a deposition he went to New York only to interview the ambassador.  He was asked the question:

Now, with regard to Ambassador Zarif, did you have any other conversations with him during this five-month period in the middle of 2006 for which you have no calendar entries?[24]

Parsi answered:

I had e-mail exchanges, and on numerous occasions, I had the opportunity to interview him.[25]

Parsi’s statement is not true.  The emails he exchanged with Zarif demonstrate their relationship involved far more than interviews and, in fact, they collaborated on numerous issues.  Parsi did not once state in any available email to Zarif that the purpose of his visit was to interview the ambassador.

Parsi and Zarif kept each other informed on political issues and likely conferred on a new Persian Gulf security arrangement.  They colluded to make public the Grand Bargain document that benefited the Iranian regime.  Parsi organized Zarif’s participation in a conference on Capitol Hill and helped make arrangements for the ambassador to meet members of Congress.

Oliver “Buck” Revell, former Associate Deputy Director of the FBI, reviewed the emails between Parsi and Zarif and said.

Arranging meetings between members of Congress and Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations would in my opinion require that person or entity to register as an agent of a foreign power; in this case it would be Iran.[26]

Kenneth Piernick, a former FBI special agent in counterintelligence and counterterrorism, said about the activities between Parsi and Zarif:

It appears that this [Parsi’s actions] may be lobbying on behalf of Iranian government interests.  Were I running the counterintelligence program at the bureau now, I would have cause to look into this further.[27]

In November 2009, Arizona Senator Jon Kyl forwarded a Washington Times article about Parsi’s involvement with Zarif (“Iran Advocacy Group Said to Skirt Lobby Rules”) to the attention of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and asked it to respond to the following questions:

Is DOJ investigating the allegations put forward in this article?  If not, why?

• Has DOJ found the allegations in this article to be true?
• What is the proper recourse against a 501(c)(3) group that engages in lobbying activities on behalf of a foreign government without registering as a lobbyist or filing papers with DOJ indicating the group is a local agent of a foreign government?[28]

No information has been made public on the DOJ’s response, if any.  NIAC was never investigated.

[1] “Periodic Report on National Endowment for Democracy Financial and Program Activities for Grant #202-362 Video and Media Training Workshops in Iran,” National Iranian American Council, January 31, 2003.

[2] www.iranlobby.com

[3] Ibid.

[4] PBS Interview with Richard Armitage, July 12, 2007.  http://www.pbs.org/wghb/pages/frontline/showdown/ interviews/armitage.html

[5] “Did Iran Offer a ‘Grand Pargain’ in 2003?” by Steven J. Rosen, American Thinker, November 16, 2008.

[6] Treacherous Alliance, Trita Parsi, Yale University Press, 2007.

[7] Ibid.

[8] www.iranlobby.com

[9] www.iranlobby.com

[10] The NGO, Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran (CASMII), was established in December 2005, to link anti-war groups with NIAC and other pro-Iran organizations.  This effort may have led to Parsi’s contact with  Gareth Porter and antiwar.com.

[11] “Iran Proposal to US Offered Peace with Israel,” Gareth Porter, Inter Press Service, May 24, 2006.

[12] Deposition of Dr. Trita Parsi, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 08 CV 00705 (JDB), December 1, 2010.

[13] Ibid.

[14] “Why Iran Wants to Talk,” Editorial, Washington Post, March 18, 2006.

[15] www.strategicassessments.org

[16] www.iranlobby.com

[17] www.iranlobby.com

[18] www.iranlobby.com

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] www.iranlobby.com

[23] Ibid.

[24] Deposition of Dr. Trita Parsi, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 08 CV 00705 (JDB), December 1, 2010.

[25] Ibid.

[26] “Iran Advocacy Group Said to Skirt Lobby Rules,” Eli Lake, Washington Times, November 13, 2009.

[27] Ibid.

[28] http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1109/Kyl_presses_for_NIAC_inquiry.html

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Survey
Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
Defamation Lawsuit
People’s Mojahedin
Trita Parsi Biography
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader

Trita Parsi was born on July 21, 1974, in Ahvaz, a city in southwestern Iran.  His family relocated to Sweden a year before Iran’s 1979 Revolution.  Parsi retained his citizenship of Iran and has a second passport from Sweden.  In the US, he’s an alien resident with a Green Card and apparently has made no effort to become a citizen.

Parsi first traveled to the US in 1991 to attend Barnsville High School in Ohio as an exchange student.  He reportedly experienced difficulties with his host family and would have had to return to Sweden had Bob Ney, then a state senator, not intervened on his behalf.  Parsi remained in the US and in 1992 he graduated from high school and then returned to Sweden.

The next period in Parsi’s life is unclear.  It is known that when he was 25 years old he traveled in the summer of 1997 to Washington, DC to work as an intern for then-Congressman Robert Ney.  In August he founded “Iranians for International Cooperation” to lobby policymakers in the US and Europe.[1]

Between 1992 and 1997, it is assumed Parsi completed an undergraduate degree.  But there is no record of where he attended school.  Available CVs of Parsi list his education at Barnsville High School and then jump to 2000, when Parsi received two graduate degrees.  Why Parsi provided no listing of an undergraduate degree on his CVs is not known.

In the summer of 1998, Parsi worked at a bank (Handelsbanken) in Stockholm and then traveled to New York, where he spent four months (Sept. 1998-Jan. 1999) at Sweden’s Mission to the United Nations.

In April 1999, Parsi applied for the position of Executive Director at the American-Iranian Council (AIC), a non-profit organization founded by Rutgers University Professor Houshang Amirachmadi.  Parsi was not selected for the position.

In November 1999, Parsi presented a paper coauthored by Siamak Namazi (see below for more details) at a conference in Cypress.

In 2000, Parsi was awarded a Master’s Degree in economics from the Stockholm School of Economics.  (His thesis focused on economic sanctions on Iran.)  Parsi’s CV from around 2000 lists a second Master’s Degree from Stockholm University.[2]   Later CVs by Parsi list the second Master’s Degree from Uppsala University.  Why the differences in the universities is another mystery about Parsi’s past.

After graduating, Parsi worked for about a year at Kreab, a communications company in Sweden.

Parsi was offered the position of Director of Development at AIC in early 2001.  After receiving a work permit, he moved to the US in February to begin work at the organization.  While at AIC, Parsi planned the structure of a new lobbying NGO.  He worked at AIC for less than a year, and then left to begin a Ph.D. program at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

In 2002, Parsi and Alex Patico co-founded the National Iranian-American Council.  The same year, Parsi was hired by Atief Bahar, an Iranian consulting company with close ties to the regime, to write a newsletter on political issues in Washington, DC regarding Iran.

From November 2001 to June 2005, Parsi was a “foreign policy advisor” to Congressman Robert Ney.

In 2003, Parsi married Amina Semlali, a Swedish citizen.  Parsi worked part-time at NIAC until completing his Ph.D. in 2006.  He obtained a Green Card to remain in the US.  His thesis was published in 2007 as a book, titled “Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States.”

In 2012, Parsi published a second book, “A Single Roll of the Dice; Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran.”

[1] Parsi was Executive Director, Babak Talebi was President, and Fareed Saeed was PR Director.

[2] No date is shown on the CV, although it lists Parsi’s “student address” in Stockholm, Sweden, which would indicate the date is prior to his relocation in the US in early 2001.

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Survey
Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
Defamation Lawsuit
People’s Mojahedin
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador

The internal operations of NIAC were exposed publicly following its defamation lawsuit against Hassan Daioleslam, a human rights activist who fled Iran in 1981.  Daioleslam relocated to the US and in 2005 set up a website, IranLobby.com, to expose the mullahs’ activities to influence US policy.

Based on his analysis of NIAC activities, Daioleslam concluded that Parsi and NIAC:

• “Are key players in the lobby enterprise of Tehran’s ayatollahs in the United States.”[1]
• “NIAC and its major figures, such as [former Congressman] Bob Ney and Trita Parsi are effective nodes of Tehran’s efforts to manipulate US policy toward self-serving ends.”[2]
• “This organization [NIAC], with strong connections to the inner circles of power in Tehran, and interest groups outside Iran has the specific role of lobbying the US Congress by utilizing unwary ordinary Iranian Americans concerned about their inborn land.”[3]

Parsi and NIAC filed a defamation lawsuit against Daioleslam in May 2008, hoping to stop his further investigations and release of information about the organization.  Discovery lasted for more than two years.  The court had to compel Parsi and NIAC to produce information on NIAC’s computers, calendar entries, emails, and other documents.

At one point, Parsi and NIAC filed an emergency motion to prohibit the public distribution of information uncovered in the discovery process.  The court denied the motion, stating NIAC had also made public statements about the litigation and it would not restrain debate on the lawsuit, which it described as “an issue of substantial public importance.”[4]

During discovery, Parsi and NIAC failed to produce thousands of discoverable records.  PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) was hired to conduct a forensic investigation of NIAC’s computers.  It located 4,159 unreproduced records.  Other elements of the case include:

• NIAC claimed it had searched its office backup server and found no relevant documents or calendar files.  PWC discovered it contained 72 files and hundreds of calendar entries.

• Patrick Disney, NIAC’s Assistant Legislative Director, kept tract of his time and events by allocating them to different categories. On February 23, 2010, he altered 130 files, changing their reference from “lobbying” to “legislative direct,” in violation of a court order to not modify any files.

• On May 6, 2010, Parsi claimed his laptop was stolen in Norway and said its files had never been backed up.

• Parsi declared he used his office desktop computer until November 2010 and that there were no PST files on the laptop he purchased to place the stolen laptop.  (PST is a file format developed by Microsoft for messages, calendar events, and other items on its Outlook software.)   According to forensic evidence, Parsi stopped working on his office desktop on June 5, 2010, and did not continue to use it until November 2010.  It’s believed Parsi provided the false information to prevent a forensic scan of his new laptop.  About Parsi’s false statement, Daioleslam’s lawyers said it “should be enough to warrant the most serious of discovery sanctions.”[5]

In September 2012, the court dismissed the lawsuit and Daioleslam’s motion for summary judgment was granted.  The judge sanctioned Parsi and NIAC for their discovery abuses and ordered them to pay most of the legal expenses.

To demonstrate his independence with the mullahs, Parsi recounted hee had criticized the Iranian regime’s human rights record.  The court was unimpressed.  “That Parsi occasionally made statements reflecting a balanced, sharedblame approach,” the judge said, “is not inconsistent with the idea that he was first and foremost an advocate for the regime.”[6]

Additionally, the court noted Parsi’s criticism of the regime did “not come close to specifically condemning – or even mentioning – the ‘torture, mass executions, rapes of women in prison, and stoning’ that defendant [Daioleslam] accuses him of ignoring.”[7]

The court chastised Parsi and NIAC for filing the frivolous lawsuit and repeatedly trying “to evade their discovery obligations,” and directed they pay a penalty of $183,480.09.

 

[1] Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Hassan Daioleslam, United States District Court for the District of Colombia, Civil Action No. 08-705 (JDB), May 23, 2008.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Hassan Daioleslam, United States District Court for the District of Colombia, Civil Action No. 08-705 (JDB), Order, November 16, 2009.

[5] Trita Parsi and NIAC vs. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, November 14, 2011.

[6] Memorandum Opinion, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Hassan Daioleslam, United States District Court for the District of Colombia, Civil Action No. 08-705 (JDB), September 13, 2012.

[7] Ibid.

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Survey
Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
People’s Mojahedin
Trita Parsi Biography
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador

NIAC is registered as a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization and is restricted from spending a “substantial part of its activities” in lobbying.

The organization declared to the Internal Revenue Service on its 2006 and 2007 tax returns that it was not involved in any lobbying.  But this is incorrect.

In one example of NIAC’s lobbying in 2007 was its campaign to block US government funding to promote democracy in Iran.  The organization spearheaded a letter to US lawmakers opposing the funding.  As described in a news article:

“In its letter to US lawmakers, the NIAC, which receives US government funding for Iran programs, said the money [to promote democracy] would be better spent on activities outside Iran to promote civil society.  ‘Iranian reformers believe democracy cannot be imported,” the letter said.’”

The Washington Post also discussed the NIAC letter.  It reported the “open letter organized by the National Iranian American Council” was signed by 23 other groups.

Sending a letter to Members of Congress and organizing the participation of nearly two dozen other groups to influence their opinion on legislation is lobbying and a clear example of NIAC’s efforts to “influence national, state, or local legislation.”

In 2008, NIAC acknowledged on its tax forms that it was, in fact, engaged in lobbying, but claimed its expenditures did not exceed 20 percent, the amount allowable for 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations.

In May 2008, NIAC hired Patrick Disney as Assistant Legislative Director.  Among his responsibilities, he was involved in “writing letters to [Congressional] Members,” meeting with their staff on pending legislation, and urging “Members of Congress or their staff to cosponsor legislation.”

Disney acknowledged NIAC also occasionally drafted legislation for consideration by Members of Congress.  Additionally, “There was outreach to Members of the Congress and their staffs,” Disney said, “and I also played a supporting role in our programming events and which included briefings on the Hill [Congress] and conferences.”

A NIAC memorandum discussed one of NIAC’s lobbying efforts:

“We [NIAC] decided to push [Congressman Howard] Berman, others in the House [of Representatives] to write a letter to [President] Obama endorsing an interests section.  Also, [we are] getting the seven senators who wrote the letter to [President Bush] to resubmit it to [President] Obama.”

A couple months after joining NIAC, Disney wrote a memo on the organization’s lobbying activities.  He suggested that he and Emily Blout, NIAC’s Legislative Director, should register as lobbyists:

“Under this expansive view of ‘lobbying,’ I find it hard to believe Emily and I devote less than 20 percent of our time to lobbying activity.  I believe we fall under this definition of ‘lobbyist.’”

After the memo was publicly disclosed, NIAC said Disney was uninformed about the definition of lobbying and was not required to register as a lobbyist.

Disney tried to destroy evidence that NIAC was heavily involved in lobbying.  To keep track of his daily activities, he listed the amount of time he spent on various issues and activities.

On February 23, 2010, Disney altered 130 computer files, changing their reference from “lobbying” to “legislative direct.”  The reclassification of his time at NIAC was uncovered during a forensic assessment of his computer. (See Defamation Lawsuit below.)

Other organizations that are familiar with NIAC’s activities in Washington also agree the organization spends a significant amount of time lobbying members of Congress.  According to the head of the American Iranian Council (AIC):

“NIAC has a direct connection to Congress, they ask their members or others to send their positions and views, they provide form letters and emails to their members…We do none of this at AIC because we are not a lobbying organization. If AIC was to do what NIAC does, then we would be violating our 501(c)(3) status. That is my understanding of the law.”

Art of Lobbying…and Lying

When NIAC was created in 2002, it discussed on its website the “art of lobbying” and boasted of  its ability to influence members of Congress.  Parsi said “NIAC members have educational and experimental knowledge on the lobbying process and politics in America.”

Parsi said NIAC, to be successful, needed to “mobilize large groups of Iranian-Americans.”  Thus one of NIAC’s first priorities, he said, was to create a “comprehensive database in order to assemble a dependable communication network amongst the Iranian groups across America.”[9]

NIAC proposed to set up workshops with former lawmakers and lobbyists.  As Iranian-Americans, he said, “we must establish connections on Capitol Hill to establish early-warning systems about proposed votes or bills that may oppose the best interests of Iranian-Americans.  NIAC’s capacity-building workshops will give our community the ability to slowly but surely participate more actively in American politics.” [emphasis added]

Thus, a primary purpose in establishing NIAC was to bring Iranian-Americans into the political process and organize them to influence votes and bills in Congress.

NIAC’s website no longer mentions its “art of lobbying” and ability to influence members of Congress.  On its 2008 tax return, NIAC described its significant actions as follows:

“Promotion of Iranian-American participation in American life, establishment of a web site and activities to encourage the community embrace the Iranian culture, while assimilating into American life, dissemination of information concerning issues pertaining to Iranian Americans and their civil rights.”

The nonsensical dribble fails to make any mention of NIAC’s extensive actions to influence policy in Washington and is but another lie to hide the organization’s true intentions, which it declared on its 2002 website.

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Survey
Iranians for International Cooperation
Defamation Lawsuit
People’s Mojahedin
Trita Parsi Biography
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador

 

Parsi is not well liked by members of the Iranian-American community, according to a July 2011 survey by the Pro-Democracy Movement of Iran (PDMI), an Iranian monarchist organization.

Based on the results of a survey, PDMI said “The Iranian-American community considers the ‘self-appointed’ Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) an intellectually dishonest regime apologist and an unofficial and unregistered lobbyist for the Iranian regime.”

Additionally, PDMI said, “He [Parsi] contributes to the regime’s agenda and serves the interest of those in power in the Islamic Republic of Iran, not the Iranians, nor the Iranian-Americans.”

In the survey, “96% of the Iranian-Americans expressed that Trita is a lobbyist for the Iranian regime.”  And over 95% of the respondents “believe the NIAC does not represent their interests or their views.”

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
Defamation Lawsuit
People’s Mojahedin
Trita Parsi Biography
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador

NIAC claims to be the “largest grassroots organization in the US to advance the interests of the Iranian-American community.”[1]  This assertion, like many others by NIAC, is a sham.

In a board meeting on October 26, 2007, Parsi discussed the organization’s memberships.  According to the minutes of the board meeting:

“Trita reviewed the membership trends: 1,034 (2005) increased to 1,307 in 2006 and 1,680 [2007] as of today – citing these figures as absolutely unacceptable”[2]

NIAC’s membership totals were clarified in the minutes of a subsequent board meeting on February 22, 2008:

“NIAC’s membership has (sic) risen to approximately 2,000 members; Current members – 1,068 (902 expired).” [3]

The above statement revealed that NIAC’s membership totals are a combination of current paid members (1,068) plus former members who declined to renew their membership (908).  Parsi confirmed this artifice in a deposition in 2011.[4]

NIAC’s publicly announced membership totals are thus bogus and include both current and past members.

In 2008, the number of current and past members totaled 1,976 (1,068 + 908).  This means 46% of the members (908) had not renewed their memberships.

Assuming 46% of NIAC’s membership totals in previous years were expired, the organization’s actual number of memberships would have been:

Year	Current & Past  Memberships	Actual Memberships
2005	1,034	559
2006	1,307	706
2007	1,680	908
2008	1,976	1,068

NIAC’s manipulate membership totals are revealing in other ways.  The organization in February 2008 had 1,976 current and past members.  This means only 1,976 people in total had joined NIAC since its establishment in 2002 (1,068 paid members plus 908 previous members who declined to renew their membership.)

The NIAC membership totals additionally reveal that about half of all the people who at one join NIAC later decide to discontinue their membership!

In applications for grants, NIAC also falsely inflated the number of its memberships and misrepresented its total active supporters.

In a September 2010 grant application to the Parsa Community Foundation, NIAC claimed it had “nearly 4,000 paid members and 35,000 active supporters nationwide.”[5]  How the organization quadrupled its paid memberships (1,068 in 2008 to nearly 4,000 in 2010) in just two years is anybody’s guess.

NIAC’s claim that it had tens of thousands of “active supporters” is pure fabrication.  According to Parsi, NIAC’s “active supporter” list is one and the same as its mailing list.[6]  Thus, when NIAC distributes information to someone who may be interested to learn about its activities or to individuals it seeks to inform or influence (reporters, officials, think tanks, etc.), they automatically become an “active supporter” of NIAC.

Why it would not be “deceitful” to inflate NIAC’s membership by 25 times the actual number is unknown.In 2007, a NIAC board member suggested the organization publicly state it had 25,000 members when, in fact, it had only 1,068 members.  Alex Patico, a co-founder of NIAC, said at the meeting, “it would not be deceitful to mention NIAC as being comprised of 25,000+ members when dealing with the media and other inquiries.”[7]

In the grant application to the Parsa Foundation, NIAC claimed its “grassroots network” provided 70 percent of its annual budget.  This number too is phony.

Grassroots is commonly defined as people at a local level.  But for NIAC, its “grassroots network” conveniently includes large Iranian-American organizations, such as the Parsa Foundation, which donated a half million dollars to the organization in 2011.[8]

In 2010, NIAC reported on its tax return that it generated $77,981from membership dues and $817,526 from grants, gifts, etc.[9]  No monies were listed from any other fundraising events.  Thus, in 2010, NIAC generated only 8.7% of its funds from its “grassroots network,” not 70% as it dishonestly claimed.

Parsi’s misstating of NIAC’s membership numbers and supporters appears to be habitual.  On his 2005 resume, he declared he had “increased membership [at NIAC] to 10,000 in less than a year.”[10]  How Parsi achieved this feat, when the organization only had about 500 paid members, remains a mystery, as well as the 9,500 phantom members.

The number of Iranian-Americans living in the US is estimated to be as high as 2 million.  Given NIAC’s miniscule membership totals, it can hardly claim to speak for the Iranian-American community and is certainly not the largest grassroots Iranian-American organization in the US.

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Survey
Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
Defamation Lawsuit
People’s Mojahedin
Trita Parsi Biography
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador