National Iranian-American Council – Page 8

Iran Lobby-The Goal of Misdirection

February 20, 2015 by admin

Yesterday one of the Iranian regime’s most loyal lobbying groups, the National Iranian American Council, took out a full page ad in the New York Times. In it, the NIAC decrying House Speaker John Boehner’s invitation for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress on Iran’s nuclear program.

There is no argument that the Israeli leader’s presence is a controversial and divisive one, but the real issue at hand here is not his remarks, but the omnipresent effort by NIAC and other Iran sympathizers to do virtually anything to change the channel away from the key issues surrounding the Iranian regime’s conduct and instead shine the spotlight on other perceived villains.

If Trita Parsi of the NIAC thought it would work, he would probably also take out full page ads in American newspapers blaming global warming, high cholesterol and the upcoming fifth season of Game of Thrones for derailing nuclear talks between Iran’s mullahs and the P5+1 group of nations.

But the advertisement is instructive on several levels.

One, it shows just how desperate Iran’s mullahs have become. At a time when ISIS and other terror groups pledging loyalty to them are busy beheading and burning Christians, Jordanians, Iraqis, Japanese, Britons, Egyptians and Americans on television around the clock, the American people’s concern over foreign affairs and fanatic Islam has now shot through the roof.

A new poll conducted and released by CBS News showed a whopping 65 percent of Americans view ISIS as a major threat, up from 58 percent in October, with a majority of Republicans, Democrats and independent viewing ISIS as their top concern above jobs and the economy.

The poll further showed a growing groundswell of support among Americans for the use of American ground troops to stop ISIS with 57 percent now favoring sending combat troops into Syria and Iraq. What bodes ill for Iranian regime sympathizers is the sharp rise among Democrats for action with a majority now supporting combat action.

Which leads us to the second issue Iran’s mullahs are terrified about which is the U.S., pushed by concern over ISIS and continued failures at the bargaining table to win nuclear concessions from them, will finally throw its hands in the air and take matter into its own hands and force both issues.

Iran’s religious cadres have worked tirelessly to gain control over Iraq’s political and military leadership. It has used the growth of ISIS as an excuse to move its Quds Force and the Revolutionary Guard Corps into Iraq and take over control of Shiite militias, as well as gain understanding of American combat tactics from Iraqi units trained by departing American forces.

Without making any concessions in nuclear talks, Iran’s mullahs have managed to solidify their grip on Iraq and Syria and make deep in roads with Islamic extremist movements making gains in Yemen, Nigeria, Libya, Chad and Sudan.

Iran’s mullahs have also managed to quash any dissent at home and have felt comfortable enough to arrest and imprison American journalists and missionaries without charge or trial and without fear of any retribution.

Lastly, NIAC’s ad also reveals the almost pathological effort to find any villain it can blame for another failure in nuclear talks, especially when Mullah’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei once again went on another public rant this week denouncing the U.S. and West, threatening economic repercussions on Europe and recommitting to a nuclear future.

The timing of the ad in light of Khamenei’s venting is auspicious and a clear sign NIAC is hard at work covering for the Iranian regime.

Parsi’s latest tactic only reveals the ever-growing weakness in the Iranian regime’s position as the March 24th deadline fast approaches.

By Michael Tomlinson

Trita Parsi and The Big Lie

February 11, 2015 by admin

Yesterday the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued an order in regards to damages and compensation awarded by the District Court to Seid Hassan Daioleslam, an Iranian American who investigated the National Iranian American Council’s ties to the Iranian regime, as a result of a defamation suit brought by NIAC and its president, Trita Parsi.

The order by the Court only dealt with the issue of reimbursements owed by NIAC to Mr. Daioeslam as a result of the costs he incurred in responding to and researching of NIAC’s claims against him.

It is worth noting the Court upheld the factual elements of the case, which included a litany of bad-faith actions by Parsi and NIAC to avoid, evade, hide and in some cases destroy evidence linking both to key members of the Iranian regime. The core elements of the case against Mr. Daioleslam were thrown out and instead valuable information was unearthed during the course of discovery that proved highly problematic for Parsi and NIAC.

A good roundup of the case merits appeared on Breitbart.com (http://www.breitbart.com/big-journalism/2013/05/26/distorting-niac-s-court-defeat/) so I will save readers from the blow-by-blow descriptions of the case facts.

The Court of Appeal’s order also does a fine job in reiterating the central facts of the case and the lengths to which the NIAC and Parsi attempted to hide their ties to the mullahs in Iran. It is a case of missing computer hard drives, servers and software worthy of Lois Lerner and the IRS fiasco.

The full order is available for reading at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/95D577149121951685257DE80053C062/$file/12-7111-1536782.pdf

The relevant portion of the order comes last in which the appellate panel writes:

“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part the District Court’s award of sanctions, and reverse the award of Mr. Daioleslam’s expenses in preparing the portions of his sanctions motion related to NIAC’s alteration of a document and Parsi’s interrogatory responses, as well as the award of post-judgment interest to run from September 13, 2012. We remand to the District Court for reconsideration of those aspects of its judgment under the proper standard. So ordered.”

What is remarkable is the NIAC’s response in which it issued a statement implying a colossal win over Mr. Daisoleslam. At no point did the Court order dispute the facts of the case.

The NIAC willfully over 4,000 entries in electronic calendars detailing who Parsi and other NIAC officers had met with over the years, including representatives of the Iranian regime;
The NIAC willfully withheld 5,500 emails of conversations and correspondence between Parsi and other NIAC officers with Iranian officials and supporters;
The NIAC never proved any of Mr. Daisoleslam’s conclusions or results from his investigations were in fact defamatory. The first defense from defamation is truth;
The NIAC’s failure to produce computers and servers whose existence was only discovered through a forensic sweep of hard drives.

A full listing of all of the charges made against NIAC can be found here at The Legal Project: http://www.legal-project.org/4024/predatory-lawsuit-rebounds-back-on-iranian-front

In short, the Court of Appeals asked the District Court to recalculate the compensation owed to Mr. Daisoleslam by NIAC, taking into account a change in which interest had to be calculated and the costs for preparing a motion related to Parsi’s interrogatory and NIAC’s changing of documents.

The Court never said that any of the facts of the case regarding NIAC and Parsi’s conduct and evasions were in error. It simply required a slight accounting change from the $183,000 award originally given. Once the lower court recalculates the award, NIAC will have no choice but to finally pay up.

Interestingly, NIAC’s statement attempts to reposition the accounting change as a vindication over the facts of the case, which is absurd since they lost of a summary judgment which found all claims made by NIAC to be false.

But trying to make gold out of manure is nothing new for Parsi and NIAC as evidenced by the most recent debacle where they pushed for a delay for a framework nuclear deal and instead of securing the June 30^th deadline, they ineptly pushed a new deadline up by two months to March 24^th.

Any rational person reading the first two pages of the appellate ruling will quickly come to the conclusion that NIAC and Parsi in particular are accomplished practitioners of the Big Lie for Iran mullahs.

ISIS New Low and the Change It Brings

February 4, 2015 by admin

The world watched in horror yesterday as the terror group ISIS broadcast video of its execution of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kassasbeth by burning him alive in a cage and then burying him with a bulldozer. The imagery was graphic, searing into the international consciousness a new level of revulsion that even surpassed the beheadings ISIS had delivered earlier with regularity.

But what happened in the 24 hours following al-Kassabeth’s death was more revealing of where exactly the world stands in the face of such unremitting brutality. Jordan acted swiftly, executing two prisoners it had in its custody with a promise from official sources of swift and harsh response and retribution.

Japan and Great Britain joined in solidarity as did many other nations who have had nationals at risk or killed by ISIS during its rampage across Iraq and Syria. The death was so shocking and in contradiction to Islamic practices which forbid cremation that other moderate Muslim nations quickly expressed their own revulsion at this act.

Predictably, Iranian regime was not one of those nations and gave a formal condemnation with notable delay almost a day after the international outrage about the crime. Its supporters in the U.S. were even more quiescent; not even offering a simple tweet of revulsion at the act. In fact, in the case of Iran’s chief lobbying ally, the National Iranian American Council, there were no public statements. Its leading official, Trita Parsi made only one mention of the incident before launching into tweets criticizing Jordan’s King Hussein.

The rest of Iran’s supporters and sympathizers ranging from Ali Gharib to others were similarly silent on any condemnation of the brutal act. It does foster the question of why?

One could assume that it does not serve Iran’s interest to condemn ISIS since its intervention in Syria’s civil war on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad is in large part responsible for the growth of ISIS in the first place. But why would U.S.-based groups, sympathetic to Iran, such as NIAC simply not join the vocal outrage over this death? What would it cost them to send out a single tweet saying this was “gross” or “horrible” or even “tragic”?

But none of those things occurred and we are left with a better understanding of the true nature of Iran’s support network. Its sole aim and mission is to represent the interests of Iran here and most importantly to lobby hard against any re-imposition of economic sanctions during the ongoing third round of negotiations with the P5+1.

In contrast though to the NIAC has been the vocal condemnation sent out by Iranian resistance groups, most notably the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Its denouncement by Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, a woman at the head of a leading Muslim organization, is noteworthy because it forcefully takes a stand other Muslim groups do not and joins with the broader global outrage over the event.

Therein lays another odd quirk of the Iranian regime’s obsessive interest in fabricating regular attacks on the NCRI. Even with the world debating this violent act, the Iranian lobby spends considerable energy posting editorials attacking NCRI.

Why?

Because the mere existence of a group of Iranians dedicated to opposing the mullahs regime is anathema to them and puts a spotlight on the lie they perpetuate that all of Iran is united behind their rule. It is the most glaring blind spot mullahs ruling Iran have and a constant reminder to them of the essential weakness of their position in nuclear talks.

At the end of the day, Iran’s mullahs cannot be trusted and that is at the heart of why both Senate Democrats and Republicans are more than willing to toe the line and impose sanctions on March 24th should Iran not deliver a substantial and meaningful agreement to their liking.

The intelligence uncovered by the NCRI on human rights abuses and covert nuclear research sites has been instrumental in revealing the deceit of the regime and the mere fact they cannot recognize the barbarity of the death of al-Kassasbeth adds to the damning truth that Iran tacitly approves of what happened.

By Michael Tomlinson

Iran – New Attempts To Become Iraq’s Puppetmaster?

January 22, 2015 by admin

Amid the marches and events in Paris and throughout the world in response to the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and its aftermath, the world’s news media paid scant attention to new developments in Iraq as Iran has dramatically scaled up not only its military presence but also its involvement in the internal affairs of Iraq.

Writing for the Associated Press, Hamza Hendawi Qassim Abdul-zahra reported the growing perception of Iraqis that Iran was their nation’s best ally against the growing influence of ISIS rather than the air campaign being waged by the United States and its allies.

He writes: “Shiite, non-Arab Iran has effectively taken charge of Iraq’s defense against the Sunni radical group, meeting the Iraqi government’s need for immediate help on the ground.

“Two to three Iranian military aircraft a day land at Baghdad airport, bringing in weapons and ammunition. Iran’s most potent military force and best known general — the Revolutionary Guard’s elite Quds Force and its commander Gen. Ghasem Soleimani — are organizing Iraqi forces and have become the de facto leaders of Iraqi Shiite militias that are the backbone of the fight.”

These fast moving developments have largely gone unnoticed, but may end up proving to be the most consequential changes happening in the Middle East because Iran’s control over Iraq would give it unprecedented reach and influence over the two large petroleum economies with two of the largest military powers.

The fact that Iran’s earlier puppeteering of Nouri al-Maliki’s government and its intervening in Syria’s civil war on behalf of Bashar Assad’s government directly led to the birth and explosive growth of ISIS in the first place is fast receding from everyone’s memory.

Iran’s lobbying machine and PR allies such as the National Iranian American Council have been quick to point out the potential value of a U.S.-Iran partnership against ISIS; conveniently ignoring the irony in such a marriage.

In fact, in a piece in Iran Media Focus, NIAC’s head and chief Iran apologist, Trita Parsi, was busy lambasting Congressional Republicans over the possibility of new Iran sanctions while defending a U.S.-Iran alliance.

But what is the end game for Iran’s ruling mullahs with this stepped up influence over Iraq? One possible scenario was detailed in a piece in Commentary Magazine where Michael Rubin noted a report in the Fars News Agency that “Iraqi Oil Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi will visit Tehran to ‘discuss joint Iran-Iraq oil fields, export of Iran’s gas to Iraq and trade of oil products.’ The article continues to say that Iran and Iraq have “agreed to develop their joint oilfields through setting up joint companies under a single management.”

It is also clear that Iran’s leadership has also harbored a deep-seated animosity towards members of the Iranian resistance who reside in camps located in Iraq and have persuaded Iraqi security forces to attack and harass them in the past. Firm control of Iraq by Iran could mean a massacre of these brave resistance members on par with the slaughter of civilians by extremists groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria or ISIS of Yazidis in Iraq.

These developments are disturbing and warrant response from the West. At the very least as a new round of nuclear talks begin, it is incumbent on the P5+1 negotiators to press Iran for a complete withdrawal from Iraq and a cessation from meddling in its internal affairs, let alone a blatant takeover of the country.

It is the height of hypocrisy to allow Iran a free hand in Iraq and simply replace the domination of ISIS with the domination of Iran. It is especially noteworthy given the evidence beginning to pile up of Iranian regime’s complicity in the birth and expansion of ISIS and other affiliated extremist groups. If anything, Iranian mullahs have positioned themselves as the mother ship for Islamic extremism and its reach can be seen in Paris, Ottawa, Sydney, Yemen, Lebanon and elsewhere.

The U.S. and the West should not allow Iran’s theocracy a free hand in Iraq, nor should it be given a window of opportunity to increase its strength there and cement a foothold that it is hurriedly nurturing every day.

By Michael Tomlinson

The Tragedy at Charlie Hebdo and the Silence That Followed

January 8, 2015 by admin

The vicious and meticulously executed attack by Islamic extremists on the French news weekly Charlie Hebdo in Paris resulted in the mass killings of journalists, cartoonists and police officers. It has been widely condemned by the international community as a blatant effort to muzzle a free press and punish any of those seeking to shine a spotlight on the radical thugs now perverting Islam and sowing death and destruction around the world.

Social media has been filled with sympathetic tweets and hashtags of #jesuischarlie as the world expresses its revulsion at this act and begins to grapple with the larger and ever growing problem of radicalization of people drawn to the preaching and messages of violence from groups such as ISIS and state-sponsors of terror such as Iranian mullahs.

Curiously there has been one quiet corner of the Internet and that is the domain occupied by the supporters and advocates of the Iranian regime. A casual perusal of the social media feeds of people such as Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council showed a lack of commentary or condemnation of the attack. In Parsi’s case he did not even post any comment on the attack until hours later and even then provided a link to an editorial by Juan Cole that attempted to rationalize the murders in the context that it did not represent a broader indictment of Muslims.

Why this is curious is when compared to other acts such as the rioting in Ferguson, Missouri or even the recent protests by New York Police Department officers against New York Mayor Bill de Blasio, Parsi has been vocal and quick to cite these incidents and condemn them. Yet in a case where he could have made a clear demarcation between the violent and extremist acts of Muslims intent on perverting a religion for their own gains, he remained largely silent.

This deafening lack of protest from supporters of Iran illustrates the tightrope they attempt to navigate by avoiding any potential linkages back to Iran from acts of terror and violence occurring around the world. It is well established that Iranian regime’s militant brand of sectarian violence and policy has been at the heart of conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Yemen just to name a few places. Yet, none of these actions such as the supply of weapons and cash to terror groups such as Hezbollah nary once engender a word of protest or tweet of outrage from Parsi and company.

It points to the rank hypocrisy of the Iranian lobby in condemning acts in the West that help Iran point an accusing finger yet never question the almost daily barbarous acts of violence committed by the Iranian regime and its agents around the world and against its own people.

Members of the U.S. Congress, recently sworn in, should take the opportunity to not only note what Iranian regime supporters such as Parsi tweet and post, but more importantly, what they don’t post or protest.

Sometimes the silence is just as damning as the words.

By Laura Carnahan

Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador

August 21, 2014 by admin

Trita Parsi has had close working relationship with Javad Zarif, when he was Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations. In a deposition, Parsi stated he only communicated in 2006 with Zarif in order to “interview him.” But this is not true.
Emails made public demonstrate that Parsi and Zarif collaborated on numerous political issues. Parsi publicly distributed an Iranian regime document to influence US policy. He made arrangements for the ambassador to participate in a conference on Capitol Hill and to meet members of Congress, and sought the ambassador’s council regarding the feasibility of a new Persian Gulf security arrangement.
About the collusion between Parsi and Zarif, a former Associate Deputy Director of the FBI said Parsi should have been registered as a foreign agent of Iran. Arizona Senator Jon Kyl contacted the US Justice Department, urging an investigation of Parsi.

It is not known when and how Parsi first met Javad Zarif, Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations (2002-2007) in New York City. Zarif currently is Iran’s Foreign Minister.

Their association dates back at least to 2003, according to a report NIAC sent to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). In the document, NIAC stated it had a relationship with Zarif “due to personal contacts between Dr. Zarif and NIAC’s Acting President, Trita Parsi.”[1]

Emails and dates of meetings between Parsi and Zarif were made public during the defamation lawsuit filed by Parsi and NIAC against Daioleslam Seif Hassan. In the discovery process, Parsi was required to hand over all of his calendar entries. For 2006, there was a five-month gap in which there are no entries.

In the available emails, both Parsi and Zarif used private email addresses to communicate. Zarif’s address was [email protected] The domain name, 141.com, was registered in 1996 at eName Technology, located in Xiamen, China. The company conceals registration information, which likely accounts for its many links to illicit domain names.

Parsi communicated with Zarif from his university email account ([email protected]) and later his personal address ([email protected]) rather than his NIAC address ([email protected]). Parsi also used a private email account when communicating with Siamak Namazi.

The emails and meeting dates made public are from 2006 and 2007. While obvious gaps exist in the communications, it’s possible to gain an understanding of Parsi’s relationship with Zarif and their collaboration on political issues.

Parsi traveled to New York City numerous times to meet Zarif. Had their relationship been casual and their discussions cursory, it’s unlikely Parsi would have made so many trips to New York. Meeting together facilitated their ability to discuss issues in detail, as well as ensured their confidentiality.

Below are the dates of emails exchanged between Parsi and Zarif and known meetings in New York City in 2006-07:

Date	Event	Date	Event
March 16, 2006	email	October 12, 2006	meeting in NYC
March 28, 2006	meeting in NYC	October 26, 2006	3 emails
March 29, 2006	2 emails	February 6, 2007	2 emails
March 30, 2006	email	February 16, 2007	2 emails
May 19, 2006	email	February 23, 2007	meeting in NYC
June 1, 2006	likely meeting in NYC	April 3, 2007	meeting in NYC
August 23, 2006	email	April 16, 2007	meeting in NYC
September 28, 2006	email	October 12, 2007	meeting in NYC
October 10, 2006	email

Parsi’s email to Zarif on March 16, 2006 confirms their personal relationship. Parsi updated Zarif on his graduate studies and indicated he wanted to get together, mentioning minimal details. In the email, Parsi stated:

Dear Ambassador,

I hope this message finds you well. I wanted to let you know that I have finished my PhD on Israel and Iran and am currently writing a book on this topic for Yale University Press.

I wanted to see if I could visit you in NY later in March or April to discuss some of the latest developments on this issue.

Very much look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Trita Parsi[2]
Twelve days after forwarding the email, Parsi met Zarif in New York City (March 28). Parsi thanked Zarif for the meeting. From the email, it is evident they talked about more than Iran-Israel relations:

Thank you so much for the meeting yesterday. I need to clarify a few points before I discuss the spring03 issue. Would you prefer to do this per email or should I call you? tp[3]

The “spring03 issue” refers to a document Zarif provided to Parsi. In the spring of 2003, the US received from the Swiss Embassy in Tehran a proposal dubbed the “Grand Bargain.” The document presented a “roadmap” to negotiate policy issues between Iran and the US. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said US intelligence investigated the overture and did not find “consonance” with face-to-face discussions with “high-ranking Iranian intelligence people.”[4] The US State Department had seen “dozens of such proposals in the past” that were without merit and it was skeptical of the document from Iran.[5] As a result, it was not given much weight.

A second version of the Grand Bargain document, known as the “American version,” supposedly originated in the US instead of Iran. As the story goes, it was transmitted received by Sadegh Kharazi, Iranian Ambassador to France, on April 27, 2003. The document was brought to the attention of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, who then “asked Ambassador Zarif to make amendments to the proposal and return it.”[6] The exact source of the document was unknown, although Iran is said to believe it “most likely” originated from Armitage.[7]

Returning to the emails, about an hour after sending the thank-you message to Zarif, Parsi forwarded a second email to clarify issues discussed during their New York meeting. Parsi’s questions refer to the American version of the Grand Bargain document:

Who was the deliverer of the proposal and how was it communicated that it was from Amitage?
In your view, what prompted the US to make such a proposal at that time?
Exactly when was the proposal sent to you? Did you receive it directly or was it first sent to another Iranian officer?
Did you respond to it directly or after consultations with Tehran?
When was a response sent to DC and how? Directly or through middle man? If later, who?
What was [the] response from [the] US side? Did the US communicate anything at all? If not, why not?
What was the reaction to Iran to the American response/non-response? How did it affect Iranian perceptions of American intentions?
How should I refer to you when talking to my contact?
Do you want me to give the contact a quote from you upfront or later?[8]

Given the questions above, it is clear that Parsi was confused by the document provided by Zarif. Parsi wanted details on the document’s pedigree and guidance on related issues. Parsi’s question, “How should I refer to you when talking to my contact?” indicates Parsi will be meeting with a contact about the document from Zarif.

Parsi’s next question, “Do you want me to give the contact a quote from you upfront or later?” would indicate the contact is with the media. That Zarif would allow Parsi to provide a quote is evidence the two men are closely associated and the Ambassador’s trust in Parsi to speak on his behalf.

Zarif responded to Parsi’s email later the same day, stating, “Either way is fine. I saw your interview on BBC. Great.” This email confirms their collaboration and the Ambassador’s eagerness to work together with Parsi. The next day, on March 30, 2006, Zarif forwarded another email to Parsi about the “spring03 issue”:

I guess we need to talk.

I was not the Iranian official who received the proposal. I got it from the Foreign Minister, who asked me to comment and prepare a reply, and told me that it had come through an intermediary from Armitage.

The claims and counter claims about the source of the proposals and motivations of intermediaries remain a mystery for me.

What I think is important is the fact that Iran was prepared.[9]

In the days that followed, Parsi made contact with Gareth Porter, an anti-war activist who regularly publishes articles sympathetic to Iran on the website “antiwar.com.”[10] Parsi briefed him about the Grand Bargain issue and provided him with the America version of the document. On May 24, 2006, Inter Press Service (IPS) distributed a news story by Porter about the Grand Bargain. He wrote:

“Trita Parsi, a specialist on Iranian foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies who provided the document to IPS, says he got it from an Iranian official earlier this year but is not at liberty to reveal the source.”[11] [emphasis added]

Parsi confirmed in a deposition that he received the copy of the Grand Bargain document from Zarif. In the deposition he was asked:

Who is the Iranian official you mention in this article [by Garth Porter] that gave you the document but who you were not at liberty to say?[12]

Parsi responded:

This is Ambassador Javad Zarif who gave me a version of a document that I already had, and I had shown that I had it to him.[13]

That Parsi previously may have obtained a version of the Grand Bargain document is irrelevant. Of importance is the timing of the decision to make the issue public and release of the document.

In January 2006, Iran had begun again to enrich uranium. In response, the UN Security Council started discussions on imposing economic sanctions against Iran. Facing the possibility of new sanctions, Iran unexpectedly announced on March 18 it would accept an offer for dialogue with the US regarding issues in Iraq. Several months earlier, Zalmay Khalilzad, US ambassador to Iraq, had received the go-ahead from President Bush to engage in direct talks with Iran on subduing militants in Iraq and securing the country.

Iran’s sudden interest in talks with the US was viewed as a ruse by many, including The Washington Post, which said, “By drawing the Bush administration into talks about Iraq, the Iranians give themselves a shot at splintering or distracting the fragile coalition [UN Security Council members] that may be forming in New York.”[14] In Tehran, officials were already indicating that potential talks with the US would likely expand to nuclear issues in Iran.

By publicly releasing the Grand Bargain document and background story, credence was given to Iran’s overture that it was serious in entering into a dialogue with the US. Parsi directly colluded in this process, thereby bolstering Iran’s propaganda campaign to influence US policymakers, in a strategy the mullahs’ hoped would derail new economic sanctions.

During this same period, Parsi and Porter agreed to work together on a venture called the Iranian Negotiation Project. On May 12, 2006, Parsi sent an email to Porter with an attached Excel spreadsheet with budget details about the project. The proposed budget was $99,810. As Project Director, Parsi would be paid $4,600/month and Porter, a Communication Advisor, would receive $5,000/month. The Project was to extend for nine months, from June 2006 through March 2007.

Parsi’s email to Porter is the only document available about the Project. Its goal appears to dovetail Iran’s objective to convince US officials to enter negotiations and sideline further sanctions.

Parsi and Porter collaborated on two additional occasions. On June 21, 2006, Parsi, Porter and David Robinson of Pax Christi were the featured speakers at a Congressional Progressive Caucus meeting titled, “Would War with Iran Help or Hurt US National Security?”

On July 24, 2006, NIAC released an issue brief co-authored by Parsi and Porter on Iran’s involvement in the War in Lebanon. Regarding the Negotiation Project, it appears to have never gotten off the ground.

Returning to the emails between Parsi and Zarif, on May 19 Parsi contacted Zarif to request his participation in a conference on Capitol Hill. Parsi additionally mentioned his work with the Strategic Assessments Initiative (SAI), a nonprofit organization that provided “legal and policy advice and guidance to parties negotiating in conflict and post-conflict situations.”[15]

Parsi said he and SAI were working “with regional governments to enhance the feasibility of a new Persian Gulf security arrangement.”

In particular, we will be working in DC to create stronger support for such an arrangement. Clearly, we need to work with the regional governments, and I would like to hold some preliminary talks with you about this, if possible.[16]

The email demonstrates Parsi’s interest in further collaboration with Zarif on another foreign policy issue. Parsi said in the email he would be in New York on June 1 and wanted to speak with Zarif on the above issues at that time, if possible.

On August 23, 2006, Parsi sent another email to Zarif, this time about a new Iranian proposal to resolve the standoff over its nuclear program. Parsi wrote:

Hope all is well and that you are back from Tehran. Would love to get a chance to see the proposal or to understand more what it entails. If it is substantial, then certainly members of Congress may find it a reasonable offer, even if the White House doesn’t. tp[17]

In late September 2006, Parsi emailed a copy of an AP news article to Zarif about John Bolton, then US Ambassador to the UN. The article said the US Senate would likely not vote on Bolton’s nomination, which would mean he would have to leave the UN at the end of his recess appointment. Bolton is an outspoken opponent of Iran’s mullahs and its nuclear program. His likely departure from the UN was good news for Iran and Parsi wanted to share the information with Zarif.

The following months, Parsi acted as an intermediary to set up meetings between Zarif and members of Congress. In an October 25, 2006 email, Parsi said, “happy to hear you will meet with [Congressman] Gilchrest and potentially [Congressman] Leach.” He continued:

There are many more that are interested in a meeting, including many respectable Democrats. Due to various reasons, they will contact you directly….There large goal is to meet with Iranian elected parliamentarians.[18]

Parsi concluded his email with an offer to assist the ambassador. “Let me know if I can be any further help,” he says.

On the following day, Parsi sent an email to Zarif to inquire if he had been contacted by Congressman Maurice Hinchey. Zanif got back to Parsi, saying “Hinchey has not called yet. I met him a few years ago.”[19]

Zarif forwards a second email to Parsi about a resolution and statements by Lavrov. About the meetings with members of Congress, the Ambassador says, “I am always open to these meetings. Your help is always welcome. I leave the modalities to your discretion.”

Zarif concluded his tenure as Ambassador to the UN in 2007. In an email in early February 2007, Parsi said he was saddened by the news of Zarif’s return to Tehran. “Would love to get a chance to see you one more time before you leave,” Parsi said. “Will coordinate with Mrs. Kamali to get on your schedule.”[20]

Parsi informed Zarif about a book John Limbert was writing on Iranian negotiation behavior. He said Limbert wanted to interview him. Minutes later Parsi dispatched another email to Javid, asking “can I forward him your private email and have you two settle details.”[21] [emphasis added]

Ten days later, Parsi asked Zarif if he had time for a meeting the following Friday. He continued:

I am having a meeting with [Congressmen Wayne] Gilchrest and [Gregory] Meeks, and they asked for our assistance in getting some communication going between the parliamentarians.[22] [emphasis added]

The email is yet another example of Parsi’s collaboration with the Iranian ambassador.

There is a four-month gap in emails between Parsi and Zarif. On June 14, 2007, Parsi sent the outgoing ambassador the following message:

Salaam – yes, they are all well. Thank you. And you? I hope all is well. Yes, I will attend the good bye party, and wanted to see if I also could schedule a meeting with you and the [new] Ambassador that same day to follow up on previous discussions? tp[23]

Before Zarif departed from New York City, Parsi had two meetings with his top assistant, Gholam Hossein Mohammadnia, presumably to ensure a continuation of Parsi’s working relationship with the Iranian mission at the UN. On October 12, 2007, Parsi met the new Iranian ambassador to the UN, Mohammad Khazaei.

Parsi claimed in a deposition he went to New York only to interview the ambassador. He was asked the question:

Now, with regard to Ambassador Zarif, did you have any other conversations with him during this five-month period in the middle of 2006 for which you have no calendar entries?[24]

Parsi answered:

I had e-mail exchanges, and on numerous occasions, I had the opportunity to interview him.[25]

Parsi’s statement is not true. The emails he exchanged with Zarif demonstrate their relationship involved far more than interviews and, in fact, they collaborated on numerous issues. Parsi did not once state in any available email to Zarif that the purpose of his visit was to interview the ambassador.

Parsi and Zarif kept each other informed on political issues and likely conferred on a new Persian Gulf security arrangement. They colluded to make public the Grand Bargain document that benefited the Iranian regime. Parsi organized Zarif’s participation in a conference on Capitol Hill and helped make arrangements for the ambassador to meet members of Congress.

Oliver “Buck” Revell, former Associate Deputy Director of the FBI, reviewed the emails between Parsi and Zarif and said.

Arranging meetings between members of Congress and Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations would in my opinion require that person or entity to register as an agent of a foreign power; in this case it would be Iran.[26]

Kenneth Piernick, a former FBI special agent in counterintelligence and counterterrorism, said about the activities between Parsi and Zarif:

It appears that this [Parsi’s actions] may be lobbying on behalf of Iranian government interests. Were I running the counterintelligence program at the bureau now, I would have cause to look into this further.[27]

In November 2009, Arizona Senator Jon Kyl forwarded a Washington Times article about Parsi’s involvement with Zarif (“Iran Advocacy Group Said to Skirt Lobby Rules”) to the attention of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and asked it to respond to the following questions:

Is DOJ investigating the allegations put forward in this article? If not, why?

Has DOJ found the allegations in this article to be true?
What is the proper recourse against a 501(c)(3) group that engages in lobbying activities on behalf of a foreign government without registering as a lobbyist or filing papers with DOJ indicating the group is a local agent of a foreign government?[28]

No information has been made public on the DOJ’s response, if any. NIAC was never investigated.

[1] “Periodic Report on National Endowment for Democracy Financial and Program Activities for Grant #202-362 Video and Media Training Workshops in Iran,” National Iranian American Council, January 31, 2003.

[2] www.iranlobby.com

[3] Ibid.

[4] PBS Interview with Richard Armitage, July 12, 2007. http://www.pbs.org/wghb/pages/frontline/showdown/ interviews/armitage.html

[5] “Did Iran Offer a ‘Grand Pargain’ in 2003?” by Steven J. Rosen, American Thinker, November 16, 2008.

[6] Treacherous Alliance, Trita Parsi, Yale University Press, 2007.

[7] Ibid.

[8] www.iranlobby.com

[9] www.iranlobby.com

[10] The NGO, Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran (CASMII), was established in December 2005, to link anti-war groups with NIAC and other pro-Iran organizations. This effort may have led to Parsi’s contact with Gareth Porter and antiwar.com.

[11] “Iran Proposal to US Offered Peace with Israel,” Gareth Porter, Inter Press Service, May 24, 2006.

[12] Deposition of Dr. Trita Parsi, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 08 CV 00705 (JDB), December 1, 2010.

[13] Ibid.

[14] “Why Iran Wants to Talk,” Editorial, Washington Post, March 18, 2006.

[15] www.strategicassessments.org

[16] www.iranlobby.com

[17] www.iranlobby.com

[18] www.iranlobby.com

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] www.iranlobby.com

[23] Ibid.

[24] Deposition of Dr. Trita Parsi, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 08 CV 00705 (JDB), December 1, 2010.

[25] Ibid.

[26] “Iran Advocacy Group Said to Skirt Lobby Rules,” Eli Lake, Washington Times, November 13, 2009.

[27] Ibid.

[28] http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1109/Kyl_presses_for_NIAC_inquiry.html

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Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader

Namazi, NIAC Ringleader

August 21, 2014 by admin

Trita Parsi traveled with Siamak Namazi to Isfahan, Iran’s third largest city, in August 2000. They also toured the Zoroastrian “Fire of Victory” Temple in Yazd.
At the time, Siamak was living in Tehran, working for Atieh Bahar, a consultant company with close ties to the government.
In 1999, Parsi and Siamak co-authored a paper that recommended setting up a lobbying organization in Washington to influence US-Iran policy. Siamak took a sabbatical in 2005 to complete a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. While at the Center, Siamak helped Parsi formulate NIAC policies supportive of the Iranian regime.

In June 2001, just months after Parsi relocated to the US to begin work as Director of Development at the American-Iranian Council (AIC), he began formulating a plan to set up his own Washington-based NGO.

Assisting Parsi in the process was Siamak’s father, Baquer, who had established the NGO, Hamyaran, in Iran and had facilitated the participation of Parsi and Siamak at the Cypress conference in 1999.

Also involved in creating the new NGO was Abbas Edalat, an Iranian academic working in the UK who in 1999 had established the Science & Arts Foundation (SAF), an NGO to provide computers and internet services in schools in Iran.[1] In 2005 he founded the Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran (CASMII), another NGO, to entice anti-war groups to support the mullahs’ political agenda.

Details of Parsi’s involvement with Baquer and Edalat were made public during the defamation lawsuit filed by Parsi and NIAC against Hassan Daioleslam in 2008.

The first available Parsi email, dated June 17, 2001, was sent to four Iranian Americans, all affiliated to Edalat’s SAF organization, and a US lawyer, about an upcoming conference call to discuss the structure of the new NGO. SAF had attracted many prominent and successful Iranian Americans who, in turn, were asked to assist Parsi set up the political NGO in Washington. The four Iranian Americans are:

Payman Ababshahi – senior research scientist at the University of Washington’s Applied Physics Laboratory.
Esmail Ghorbani – electrical engineer and founder of Enginuity Search.
Susan Tahmasebi – women’s rights and civil society activist.
Fereydoun Taslimi – Chief Technology Officer at PerformanceIT and founder of Informatics Sciences.

The lawyer, Brian L. Oliner, founded the charity, Children of Persia. In the June 17^th email, Parsi listed five issues he wanted to discuss:

Lift sanctions or grant exemption for non-profits?

501C3 or Not?
Extent of cooperation with other groups.
When to go public?
Importance of doing the groundwork in Congress.

Parsi said a “key decision” for the group was whether the new NGO should lobby to lift all economic sanctions on Iran or “simply lobby for an exemption for non-profits.” Parsi then lectured the Iranian Americans, misinforming them about the politics behind the sanctions. Parsi said:

It is important to keep the following in mind: The main purpose of the sanctions are not to halt Iran’s alleged attempts to acquire WMDs or halt its alleged support to terrorist groups. The main purpose is to constitute a political obstacle to a US-Iran dialogue and improved US-Iran dialogue and improved US-Iran relations. From the Israeli perspective (the sole force behind the lobby efforts to impose and now extend the sanctions), every step Washington takes toward Tehran is a step away from Tel Aviv.[2]

Parsi told the Iranian Americans the new NGO should have the ability to lobby every member of Congress:

In order to be successful, we must have the resources to meet with all offices on the Hill (app.535). We should be careful about giving the impression of being able to successfully carry through with our mission until we have gathered the necessary sources. [emphasis added][3]

After their conference call, Parsi distributed an email with the minutes of their conversation. During the call, the Iranian Americans said they preferred the NGO initially lobby for an exemption for non profits, rather than the removal of all sanctions.

Parsi and Edalat disagreed. On June 23, 2001, Parsi sent an email to the group, supporting Edalat’s proposal to have the NGO both lobby to remove sanctions, as well as seek an exemption for non-profits. Parsi wrote:

I think Prof. Edalat is right on point. Combining the two goals will also enable us to work with allies both within and outside Congress who perhaps would oppose an effort to just get the NGO exemption, as such a move might make the lifting of the sanctions altogether more difficult.[4]

Parsi discussed the contents of the minutes from their conference call.

There has been silence since the draft minutes of last week’s telephone conference was sent to the group for your review and approval. I assume everyone has been busy, but it would be good if we could finish the minutes by Tuesday so that we can follow Mr. Ba[qu]er Namazi’s instructions and sen[d] it to Amb. Bill Miller.[5] [emphasis added]

The email reveals that Baquer Namazi is the ringleader of the group, giving instructions to Parsi and the others. Parsi is thus working with Namazi, who has close ties to the Iranian regime, and whose family members work for one of the top consulting companies in Tehran with multiple links to government officials and ministries.

The email indicates Parsi also was working with William G. Miller, then an advisor for the Search for Common Ground and a member of the board of the American Iranian Council. He earlier had been a political officer at the US Consulate in Isfahan (1959-62) and Embassy in Tehran (1962-64).

On June 25, 2001, Parsi sent an email to Fereydoun Taslimi, one of the four Iranian Americans,

regarding the minutes of the conference call, which was copied to the other members of the group. Taslimi was not pleased with the draft minutes and wanted changes.

Parsi acknowledged to Taslimi that the group preferred to restrict lobbying for the new NGO to the removal of sanctions on non-profits:

Your point on giving NGO exemption priority is well taken. In the minutes, it currently states that a majority favors that but that we also saw the need for more research. That is my understanding of our meeting, please correct me if I am mistaken.[6]

Parsi said he would “add text regarding the [group’s] wish to keep things loose without an official organization, my apologies for forgetting to emphasize that more.” He also attempted to persuade the group to change their position, stating, “Few Congressmen will support a 1-3 (sic) loosely organized charitable organizations (sic) that are (sic) not even allowed to lobby in the first place.”[7]

Additional emails are unavailable to explain what happened next. When Parsi announced the establishment of NIAC in the spring of 2002, the four Iranian Americans who had participated in the discussions of its agenda were nowhere to be seen.

Two of the Iranian Americans – Abranshahi and Tahmasebi – were later named officers of the SAF branch in Maryland, along with Edalat.

Siamak Namazi’s brother in law, Bijan Khajdhpour, who is the head of Atieh International, became the Chairman of the Board of Trustees at SAF.
[1] Edalat set up a branch in New York City in 1999 and another branch in Rockville, Maryland, in 2003.

[2] Email from Trita Parsi, Conference Call material, June 17, 2001.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Email from Trita Parsi, Re: Conference Call minutes, June 23, 2001.

[5] Email from Trita Parsi, Re: Conference Call minutes, June 23, 2001.

[6] http://www.iranian-americans.com/docs/ned1/conferenceCall.pdf

[7] Ibid.

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Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime

August 21, 2014 by admin

It’s unclear how and when Parsi first met Siamak Namazi. An article in the Washington Times said they initially got together in 1996, when Parsi “was a student in Sweden.”[1]

This may be true but, as previously discussed above, Parsi has deliberately avoided all mention of his undergraduate education in his CVs and other biography materials. Where and when he went to undergraduate school is unclear.

Siamak in 1996 was in Tehran for awhile, completing his military service, and then returned to the US to begin graduate studies at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Siamak, born in Iran on October 14, 1971, left the country with his family when he was 12. In the years that followed, he would move 11 times in 18 years, experiencing a wide range of cultures, from Nairobi, Kenya, to White Plains, New York.

After completing an undergraduate degree at Tufts University in Boston, Siamak was offered a position with an NGO in Cairo, Egypt, where his father worked. Siamak declined the job and instead traveled to Tehran in 1994 to complete compulsory military duty. Most Iranians who oppose the regime refuse to serve in its military or they make a payment in lieu of the requirement.

Siamak volunteered to return to Iran. He remained there for two and a half years, serving as a duty officer at the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning.

No public information could be located on Parsi’s participation, payment, or avoidance of the regime’s compulsory military duty.

Maybe Parsi and Siamak met while they both were in Iran. Parsi did not travel to the US until the summer of 1997, when he went to work as an intern for then Congressman Robert Ney. If Parsi and Siamak didn’t meet in Iran, where did they cross paths?

What is known is that they share a sympathetic view toward the Iranian regime and had a common interest in organizing Iranian expats to influence US governmental policies to remove the sanctions in Iran.

Parsi returned to Sweden after finishing his internship in August 1997. Siamak concluded his graduate degree at Rutgers in 1998. While at the university, he occasionally published an article for Iranian.com, an Iranian community website founded in 1995.

In 1998 article, Siamak said Iranian-Americans should study and better understand the American political system “in order to influence it.”[2] He applauded the creation of Parsi’s NGO, Iranians for International Cooperation (IIC), and said Iranian-Americans needed to add their “cultural values and ideas to the American political landscape.”[3]

Siamak said “Iran stands to gain substantially should its expatriate population hold decision-making power in foreign lands.”[4] [emphasis added] The assimilation and naturalization of the Iranian expatriate population, he said, was “in accordance with the long-term interests of Iran.”[5] [emphasis added]

Siamak asked readers to “picture the mood in the US Congress with Senators of Iranian origin.” He asked rhetorically, “Could France have sold the sophisticated technology it did to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (sic) if the French foreign ministry housed influential French-Iranian?”[6]

Atieh Bahar

Atieh Bahar (AB) is a influential consultancy firm in Iran with close ties and partnerships with the government.

AB was founded in 1993 by Pari Namazi, Siamak’s sister, and her husband, Bijan Khajehpour. The company’s legal division is headed by Babak Namazi, Siamak’s brother.

AB provides market research, public affairs, recruitment, market intelligence, business strategies, and legal assistance to companies in Iran and others looking to enter the market.

AB also contracts with government ministries and banks, as well as direct and indirect partnerships with energy and telecom companies.

Albrecht Frischenschlager, an AB Director, manages FTZ Services, a joint venture with three government free zones in Iran. His partner at Middle East Strategies is Hatami Yazd, the former head of the Bank of Saderat Iran, the country’s second largest bank. This bank and two others affiliated with Hatami are under US sanctions.

Siamak statement and question are revealing. During the early years of the war, France was aligned with Arab nations and much of the rest of the world, including the United States, in opposing Khomeini’s Iran, which sought to topple Saddam’s regime and replace it with an Islamic republic. Siamak implies France would have been blocked from supplying arms to Iraq had French-Iranians been in the foreign ministry. In other words, France would not have aligned with the West but in support of Iran’s ruling mullahs. Siamak identifies with the Iranian regime and opposes the West.

After finishing graduate school, Siamak set up a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. called Future Alliance International (FAI) to promote business opportunities in Iran. The idea likely originated from Siamak’s sister, Pari, and her husband, Bijan Khajeh Pour, who had returned to Iran in 1993 to set up a consulting firm, called Atieh Bahar, to assist foreign companies enter the Iranian market. Atieh Bahar has been highly successful due to its close ties to former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and government ministries.

In 1998, Siamak’s father set up the NGO, Hamyaran, to monitor and control other Iranian NGOs and international organizations operating in Iran.

Siamak and Parsi presented their paper at the conference in Cypress in 1999. At the time, Siamak was likely living in Tehran. What is known is that he moved in 1999 to Iran to begin work at Atieh Bahar.

Parsi founded NIAC in 2002 and began work on a Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins University. During this time, Atieh Bahar hired Parsi to write a newsletter. Parsi acknowledged he produced about 15 newsletters for the Iranian consulting company.[7]

Soon after establishing NIAC, Parsi applied for a $25,000 grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to produce a video and media training workshop in Iran. Non-Iranian groups are required to partner with an Iranian NGO for projects in Iran. It also has to be approved by Iran’s Foreign Ministry.

NIAC Collaborations with Atieh BaharOver the years, NIAC and Atieh Bahar have often collaborated Biajan Khajehpour, the head of AB, has appeared on panel discussions sponsored by NIAC, including:

Khajehpour was a panelist at the NIAC Leadership Conference in 2012.

Parsi moderated a NIAC panel discussion on “Assessing the Iran Nuclear Talks” in May 2012 that featured Khajahpour.

Khajehpour was a panelist on the NIAC “Hill Briefing,” titled “Rouhani Election Presents West with Golden Opportunity.”

Parsi and Khajehpour have also appeared jointly at other conferences. They were panelists at the Atlantic Council conference, “Changing Iran’s ‘Great Satan’ Narrative” in December 2013.

In March 2013, Parsi authored a 30-page report with Khajehpour and Reza Marshi on economic sanctions imposed on Iran.

NIAC met with an official at the Ministry and with Hamyaran, the NGO established by Siamak’s father, to discuss acceptable NGO partners. Not surprisingly, the project was approved by the regime and NAIC received the grant from NED, providing much needed financial resources for the newly formed NGO. In subsequent years, NIAC received nearly $200,000 in NED grants.

In 2005, Siamak took a sabbatical from Atieh Bahar to participate in a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC.[8] While at the Center, Siamak worked with Parsi to formulate policies at NIAC.

As evidence, in November 2005, Siamak sent an email to Parsi, suggesting an agenda for an upcoming meeting. He proposed they “develop a common list of policy recommendation[s] to enhance our ability to influence decision-makers.”[9] [emphasis added] In another email, Siamak told Parsi:

“[W]e need to carve out time to work on our discussion with [US Secretary] Burns. If you have any policy papers I can look at, I could also start working on one for [Steven] Hadley’s office [He was National Security Advisor to President George Bush]. Once a draft is available, we can get input from our network and make it stronger.”[10] [emphasis added]

These and other emails exchanged between Siamak and Parsi demonstrate Siamak’s close involvement in shaping policies at NIAC, as well as Parsi’s collaboration with the regime-linked consulting firm, Atieh Bahar.

[1] “Iran Advocacy Group Said to Skirt Lobby Rules,” Washington Times, November 13, 2009.

[2] “If Mahdi Doesn’t Come,” by Siamak Namazi, The Iranian, November 9, 1998.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Deposition of Dr. Trita Parsi, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 08 CV 00705 (JDB), December 1, 2010.

[8] In 2013, the Center published a report by Siamak, titled “Sanctions and Medical Supply Shortages in Iran.”

[9] www.iranlobby.com

[10] www.iranlobby.com

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Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan

August 21, 2014 by admin

Trita Parsi coauthored a paper with Siamak Namazi on the importance of bringing Iranian-Americans into the political process to “mend the differences and misperceptions between Iran and the United States,” which they delivered at a conference in Cypress in November 1999.[1]

The paper discusses the Iranian-America demographics, their participation as cultural ambassadors between both nations, and value of increased communications and travel.

They recommended setting up a lobbying organization in the US, patterned after the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Both Parsi and Siamak oppose economic sanctions and urged an “increased awareness” among Iranian-Americans on the “counterproductive aspects of a confrontational sanctions policy.” They said it was important for Iranian-Americans to engage “in the debate on the future of Iran-US relations,” which they described as “a rational approach to Iran,” and not the same as “support for the regime in Iran.”[2]

What is most interesting about the paper is the near absence of any negative information about the Iranian regime and its long history of repression and violence against its citizenry. There are reasons the mullahs’ regime has been described as “evil” and the “most active state sponsor of terrorism,” issues completely avoided in the paper.

Parsi and Namazi describe Iranian expats who fled the totalitarian regime as “handicapped” because of their first-hand knowledge of the regime. Expat children, they then explain, “do not carry the same emotional burdens that stand in the way of fully adapting to a new country and culture.”[3] Thus, knowing less about Iran and its vile ways is advantageous to improving relations with regime.

The Parsi/Namazi paper attacks the People’s Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK), which has long been the main opposition group advocating the replacement of the regime with a democratic government. Parsi and Namazi said involving more Iranian-Americans in the US political process “could do a lot in the way of ostracizing the MKO.”[4]

Parsi and Namazi highlight the high level of trade between Iran and the US in 1991 ($760 billion) and its subsequent decline after sanctions were applied. They avoid any discussion on the reasons sanctions were imposed. The day President Clinton signed the sanctions bill into law in 1996, he said, “You cannot do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night.”[5]

That the paper by Parsi and Namazi presents a false and misleading view of the Iranian regime is no surprise given their links to the mullahs.

The conference where they presented their paper was sponsored by the Centre of World Dialogue and by Hamyaran, an Iranian NGO established by Siamak’s father, Baquer, and an Iranian deputy minister.[6] The NGO oversees all contacts between international organizations and Iran’s NGOs to ensure they do not step out of line.[7]

Baquer reportedly made the arrangements for Parsi and Siamak to attend the conference, which was organized to promote pathways to improve US-Iranian relations and remove the economic sanctions.[8] In reality, it was a propaganda platform for the mullahs and a means to promote their foreign policy goals.

[1] “Iran-Americans: The Bridge between Two Nations,” Siamak Namazi & Trita Parsi, presented at the Dialogue and Action Between the People of Iran and America (DAPIA) Conference, Cyprus, November 1999.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Clinton Signs Bill Against Investing in Iran and Libya,” New York Times, August 6, 1996.

[6] The conference was called “Dialogue and Action Amongst the People of Iran and America.”

[7] Ibid.

[8] The conference was title “Developing Links between Iran and the United States.” See “Iran’s Web of Influence in US,” by Hassan Daioleslam, FrontPageMag.com, August 4, 2008.

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Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador

Trita Parsi Biography

August 21, 2014 by admin

Trita Parsi, a Swiss-Iranian citizen, moved to the US to set up the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) to influence US - Iran policy. He has close ties to companies linked to the Iranian regime and has collaborated with its leadership to distribute Iranian documents in the US to influence US policy toward Tehran. Parsi opposes regime change in Iran and set up a website to attack an opposition group that seeks to restore democracy and freedom in Iran. NIAC widely overstates its number of members and many Iranian Americans believe Parsi is an “intellectually dishonest regime apologist and an unofficial and unregistered lobbyist for the Iranian regime.”

Trita Parsi, a Swedish-Iranian citizen, moved to the US to set up the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) to influence US – Iran policy. He has close ties to companies linked to the Iranian regime and has collaborated with its leadership to distribute Iranian documents in the US to influence US policy toward Tehran. Parsi opposes regime change in Iran and set up a website to attack an opposition group that seeks to restore democracy and freedom in Iran. NIAC widely overstates its number of members and many Iranian Americans believe Parsi is an “intellectually dishonest regime apologist and an unofficial and unregistered lobbyist for the Iranian regime.”

Trita Parsi was born on July 21, 1974, in Ahvaz, a city in southwestern Iran. His family relocated to Sweden a year before Iran’s 1979 Revolution. Parsi retained his citizenship of Iran and has a second passport from Sweden. In the US, he’s an alien resident with a Green Card and apparently has made no effort to become a citizen.

Parsi first traveled to the US in 1991 to attend Barnsville High School in Ohio as an exchange student. He reportedly experienced difficulties with his host family and would have had to return to Sweden had Bob Ney, then a state senator, not intervened on his behalf. Parsi remained in the US and in 1992 he graduated from high school and then returned to Sweden.

The next period in Parsi’s life is unclear. It is known that when he was 25 years old he traveled in the summer of 1997 to Washington, DC to work as an intern for then-Congressman Robert Ney. In August he founded “Iranians for International Cooperation” to lobby policymakers in the US and Europe.[1]

Between 1992 and 1997, it is assumed Parsi completed an undergraduate degree. But there is no record of where he attended school. Available CVs of Parsi list his education at Barnsville High School and then jump to 2000, when Parsi received two graduate degrees. Why Parsi provided no listing of an undergraduate degree on his CVs is not known.

In the summer of 1998, Parsi worked at a bank (Handelsbanken) in Stockholm and then traveled to New York, where he spent four months (Sept. 1998-Jan. 1999) at Sweden’s Mission to the United Nations.

In April 1999, Parsi applied for the position of Executive Director at the American-Iranian Council (AIC), a non-profit organization founded by Rutgers University Professor Houshang Amirachmadi. Parsi was not selected for the position.

In November 1999, Parsi presented a paper coauthored by Siamak Namazi (see below for more details) at a conference in Cypress.

Bob Ney and Trita Parsi
Trita Parsi traveled to Barnsville, Ohio, in 1991 as an exchange student to complete his final year of high school. Of all places in the US, why he selected this remote town, with a population of less than 4,000, with a single high school and minimal faculty, is unknown.
While at the school, Parsi claimed he had problems with his host family and sought help from Bob Ney, then a state senator, who intervened on his behalf. Ney had lived in Iran, teaching English, in 1979-80, and spoke fluent Farsi. He later attended Ohio State University’s extension branch in Saint Clarsville, Ohio, about 15 miles from Barnsville.
Ney was elected to Congress in 1995. Two years later Parsi returned to the US to work as an intern in Ney’s Washington office. Parsi moved to the US in 2001 to work at the American Iranian Council (AIC) and a year later started NIAC. During this time, Parsi was an advisor to Cong. Ney, drafting speeches, press releases, and legislation.
Cong. Ney took illegal gifts from lobbyist Jack Abramoff in exchange for political favors and resigned from Congress in 2006, after pleading guilty to charges of conspiracy and making false statements. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison.

In 2000, Parsi was awarded a Master’s Degree in economics from the Stockholm School of Economics. (His thesis focused on economic sanctions on Iran.) Parsi’s CV from around 2000 lists a second Master’s Degree from Stockholm University.[2] Later CVs by Parsi list the second Master’s Degree from Uppsala University. Why the differences in the universities is another mystery about Parsi’s past.

After graduating, Parsi worked for about a year at Kreab, a communications company in Sweden.

Parsi was offered the position of Director of Development at AIC in early 2001. After receiving a work permit, he moved to the US in February to begin work at the organization. While at AIC, Parsi planned the structure of a new lobbying NGO. He worked at AIC for less than a year, and then left to begin a Ph.D. program at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

In 2002, Parsi and Alex Patico co-founded the National Iranian-American Council. The same year, Parsi was hired by Atief Bahar, an Iranian consulting company with close ties to the regime, to write a newsletter on political issues in Washington, DC regarding Iran.

From November 2001 to June 2005, Parsi was a “foreign policy advisor” to Congressman Robert Ney.

In 2003, Parsi married Amina Semlali, a Swedish citizen. Parsi worked part-time at NIAC until completing his Ph.D. in 2006. He obtained a Green Card to remain in the US. His thesis was published in 2007 as a book, titled “Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States.”

In 2012, Parsi published a second book, “A Single Roll of the Dice; Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran.”

[1] Parsi was Executive Director, Babak Talebi was President, and Fareed Saeed was PR Director.

[2] No date is shown on the CV, although it lists Parsi’s “student address” in Stockholm, Sweden, which would indicate the date is prior to his relocation in the US in early 2001.

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Bogus Memberships & Supporters
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Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
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People’s Mojahedin
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador