admin – Page 71 – Iran Lobby

Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett

August 21, 2014 by admin

Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett
Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett avoid any condemnation of Iran’s rulers and have been described as “America’s most prominent, and abrasive, defenders of the Iranian regime.”

Among the top of the list of Iran appeasers are Flynt and Hillary Leverett, both former US government officials. Flynt was a member of the National Security Council (NSC) for about a year, until forced to leave in mid 2003.[1]

The Leveretts, according to a NY Times writer, “have drunk the Islamic Republic’s Kool-Aid to the last drop.”[2] They are also known as “America’s most prominent, and abrasive, defenders of the Iranian regime.”[3]

Flynt published “Inheriting Syria” in 2006 and then he turned his attention to Iran. His next book, co-authored with his wife, titled, “Going to Iran; Why the US Must Accept the Islamic Republic of Iran,” was released the following year. It asserts the US should negotiate directly with Iran if it hopes to prevent the regime’s development of a nuclear weapon and deal with other political and security issues.

Like other Iran appeasers, the Leveretts avoid any condemnation of the regimes’ repressive and intolerant rule. They oppose economic sanctions, calling them “inhumane and illegal,” but are voiceless about the regime’s inhumane torture, flogging, and other attacks on its citizens, especially minorities.

Flynt defends the regime’s misogynist laws, claiming “this notion of gender apartheid is just belied by the reality of modern Iranian society.”[4]

The Leveretts said the US should craft “a deal recognizing Iran as an independent, truly sovereign and rightfully rising power in its own region – as the United States did with China 40 years ago.”[5]

But this analysis is deeply flawed. In the mid 1960s, a schism began to develop between the Communist governments of China and the Soviet Union. The rapprochement between China and the US was a strategic decision on both their parts to counter Soviet power and had nothing to do with wanting with China wanting to be recognized as an independent sovereign nation and rightfully rising power in the region.

The Iranian regime more closely is analogous to the Soviet Union, which sought to export communism around the world. It never was agreeable to compromising its ideology and there is no evidence Iran’s mullahs are amenable to – or capable of – modifying their fundamentalist ideology.

Flynt says the Iranian regime wants “to see signs, indicating that the United States does want a fundamentally different kind of relationship with the Islamic Republic.”[6] But he does not think it necessary for Iran’s mullahs to do the same.

Flynt, not surprisingly, is opposed to regime change in Iran. This policy option, he said, is “built on the belief that Tehran is a house of cards waiting to be pushed over and if the US is smart enough, it could push the house of cards over, and I think this is not a very prudent way to proceed.”[7] This same excuse, he neglects to acknowledge, was often voiced in the past when discussing the Soviet Union. Had the US not challenged the Soviet regime, its collapse would likely not have occurred. It was prudent for the US to aggressively challenge Moscow and it is equally prudent today to challenge the Iranian regime’s totalitarian system.

In their defense of the mullahs, the Leveretts claim an “overwhelming majority of Iranians” prefer the current regime to a “secular liberal democracy.”[8] This is a bogus comparison. Iranians want freedom and democracy and a non-fundamentalist Islam and, if given a chance, would overwhelming vote the mullahs out of power. There is widespread support in Iran for the People’s Mojahedin, which is both Islamic and pro-democratic.

Articles by the Leveretts have been featured on the NIAC and CASMII websites. Flynt has also participated at NIAC conferences.

[1] “Why Does Anyone Trust the Leveretts?” by Pejman Yousefzadeh, Newstex, February 15, 2010.

[2] “Ruthless Iran: Can a Deal be Made,” Roger Cohen, New York Times, June 6, 2013.

[3] “Huffington Post Takes Down the Leveretts,” Commentary Magazine, May 7, 2010.

[4] “The Way Forward in Iran: Engagement or Regime Change,” Atlantic Council of the United States, March 3, 2010.

[5] “America Can’t Force Iran’s Surrender,’ Politico.com, June 16, 2014.

[6] “The Way Forward in Iran: Engagement or Regime Change,” Atlantic Council of the United States, March 3, 2010.

[7] “Pentagon Sets Sights on a New Tehran Regime,” Guardian (London), May 24, 2003.

[8] “The Accommodationists,” The New Republic, March 25, 2013.

Gary Sick

August 21, 2014 by admin

Gary Sick often collaborates with other pro-Iranian appeasement groups and was instrumental in arranging Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad’s speech at Columbia University in September 2007.

Gary Sick, a former US naval intelligence officer and professor at Columbia University, is one of the most outspoken appeasers of the Iranian regime. He believes the mullahs changed their stripes long ago and Iran is no longer the “fanatic, belligerent state” of the early 1980s. “The Iran of 20 years ago,” Sick said in 1999, “is not the Iran of today.”[1]

Iran’s reform movement, according to Sick, began with the presidential election of Hashemi Rafsanjani and then continued when Mohammed Khatemi “was elected in May 1997 on a platform “dedicated to civil society, rule of law, and reconciliation with the international community.”[2] Sick claims the regime now is “more cautious, more calculated and more susceptible to conventional methods of calculation of state interests.”[3]

Sick believes if the leaders of Iran and the US would just sit down across the table from one another they could resolve major foreign policy differences that exist between the two countries.

Sick thinks Hassan Rouhani’s presidential election has ushered in a new era. “You have a new president of Iran, Hassan Rouhani – he is a moderate and he is absolutely committed to finding a solution to this nuclear issue,” gushed Sick in January 2014.[4]

Sick had a different view of Rouhani in 2000 when discussing then-President Khatemi’s achievements. Sick touted his success in “changing the entire nature of the Majlis.”[5]

“[I]n the last election in the year 2000,” Sick said, “three out of four people in the Iranian Majlis were kicked out. The old-timers were replaced with reformers.”[6] Among those given the boot was Rouhani, who had served five terms in the parliament.

Sick, like other apologists, remains blind to Rouhani’s hardliner past. In his early years, Rouhani was a close confident of Ayatollah Khomeini. He first met the ayatollah in 1963 and was a political firebrand, jailed more than 20 times, and was closely monitored by SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, for his opposition to the monarchy.

As indications of Rouhani’s trust and support by the ayatollah, when Khomeini’s son died in 1977, it was Rouhani who was selected by the ayatollah to deliver the sermon at the memorial service, and later Rouhani was at Khomeini’s side when he was exiled to Paris.[7]

Rouhani was richly rewarded for supporting Khomeini and his revolutionary policies. Few people in the regime have achieved a more illustrious career. In addition to serving in the Majlis, Rouhani managed numerous military commands and was appointed by Supreme Leader Khamenei to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Iran’s highest decision-making body for security issues.[8]Rouhani was also the national security advisor to two presidents and was elected to the Council of Experts, which selects the supreme leader and oversees his actions.

Needless to say, few, if any leaders in the regime have been more trusted to support the Islamic revolution and its export of ideology to other countries.

Rouhani’s true colors were demonstrated in July 1999 when students rallied against the government after violently attacking a group of students at Tehran University. Khatami called the assault on the students an “ugly bitter incident” and expressed “deep regret.”[9]

Rouhani sided with the attackers. To counter the student demonstrations, the regime organized its own rally that featured senior clerics from Iran’s most conservative government bodies.[10] Rouhani, one of the main speakers, declared:

“At dusk yesterday we received a decisive revolutionary order to crush mercilessly and monumentally any move to these opportunist elements [student rallies] wherever it may occur. From today our people shall witness how in the arena our law enforcement force…shall deal with these opportunists and riotous elements, if they simply dare to show their faces”[11]

Rouhani said the demonstrators would be “tried in our court as mohareb and mofsed (opponents of the republic) and those found guilty would be hanged.”[12] Rouhani said “Our revolution needs a thorough cleanup, and this will help advance the cause of the regime and the revolution.”[13]

Rouhani participated in the decisions to mount numerous terrorist attacks and assassinations. He was a member of an “extralegal” organization called the Omure Vijeh Committee (Committee for Special Operation or Special Affairs Committee), according to a high-ranking Iranian intelligence officer who defected.[14] The members of the committee instigated the terrorist attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, the Jewish Center in Buenos Aires in 1994, Khobar Towers in 1996, as well as numerous other incidents and assassinations.

In 1991, Rouhani personally oversaw the implementation of Iran’s Comprehensive National Microbial Defense Plan, which expanded the country’s nascent biological/chemical weapons program to a full-fledged weapons development program.

In 2005, Rouhani published a speech several months after he resigned as head of Iran’s top nuclear negotiator in which he described how he was able to dupe the international community and prevent the IAEA from referring Iran to the UN Security Council for violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while successfully moving Iran’s nuclear programs forward.[15]

In the speech, Rouhani “boasted that while talks were taking place in Tehran, Iran was able to complete the installation of equipment for conversion of yellowcake – a key stage in the nuclear fuel process – at its Isfahan plant but at the same time convince European diplomats that nothing was afoot.”[16]

This same Rouhani, according to Sick and other Iranian appeasers, is now a “moderate.” To recognize Rouhani for what he actually is, a hardliner and former trusted protégé of Khomeini, undercuts their premise that the regime no longer is the “fanatic, belligerent state” of the early 1980s. Thus, the appeasers mislabel Rouhani’s politics as “moderate” in order to maintain their misguided understanding of the regime.

Other appeasement statements by Sick include:

Iran-Libya Sanctions Act – The legislation was passed in 1996 in response to Iran’s major terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires and the bombing of Khobar Towers that killed 19 American servicemen. Sick called the Act an “absurd bit of legislation” and “pure demagoguery.”[17]

Sanctions – Sick said “unilateral sanctions do not work.” [T]he notion that we’re going to drive it [Iran] into bankruptcy and thereby bring down the Islamic government are romantic and infantile pipe dreams.”[18]

Regime Change – Sick opposes regime change in Iran and has attacked the main Iranian pro-democracy organization that supports the overthrow of the corrupt theocracy. Sick supports the regime’s rulers and is against the Iranian public, claiming, “There is no viable political alternative to the present system. We may not like this regime, but we’re going to have to live with it.”[19]

Invasion – Sick said “Iran hasn’t invaded anybody for 250 years. It’s not a country that is out to take over other people’s territory.”[20] Not true. Twenty-three months after Iraq invaded Iran, Saddam withdraw his forces from Iranian territory and sued for peace. Iran could have ended the conflict on favorable terms but instead attacked Iraq in an attempt to overthrow Saddam’s regime and establish an Islamic Republic. Sick also completely discounts Iran’s military and financial support for its surrogates, Hamas, a fundamentalist group that wants to remove Israel from the map, and Hezbollah, which seeks to establish a fundamentalist republic in Lebanon. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are fighting in Syria and Iraq.

Sick has worked closely with other pro-Iranian appeasement groups. Notable is his support as a founding board member of the Center for World Dialogue, which sponsored the Cypress conference in November 1999 in which Trita Parsi and Siamak Namazi delivered their paper on setting up lobbying organizations in the US to remove sanctions on Iran.[21]

Sick was instrumental in arranging Iranian President Mahmood Ahmadinejad’s speech at Columbia University on September 24, 2007.

[1] “A Look at…the Iranian Stalemate: They’re Changing. Why Can’t We?, by Gary Sick, Washington Post, March 28, 1999.

[2] “A Look at…the Iranian Stalemate: They’re Changing. Why Can’t We?, by Gary Sick, Washington Post, March 28, 1999.

[3] “Iran: The Adolescent Revolution,” by Gary Sick, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 49, no. 1, 1995.

[4] “Booker Backs Bill for Sanctions if Negotiations with Iran Collapse,” Star-Ledger (Newark), January 16, 2014.

[5] “The End of Dual Containment: Iraq, Iran and Smart Sanctions,” by Gary Sick, et.al., Middle east Policy, September 2001.

[6] Ibid.

[7] “Hassan Rouhani’s Biography,” Alalam, June 15, 2013.

[8] “Khamenei Names Ahmad Khomeini to National Security Council,” AP, November 14, 1989.

[9] “Iran Fires Security Chiefs Responsible for Dormitory Raid,” Associated Press, July 11, 1999.

[10] Iranian Hardliners Hit Streets: Conservatives Gain the Upper Hand with Tough Measures,” Calgary Herald (reprint LA Times article by Robin Wright), July 15, 1999.

[11] “Iran’s Moderate President?” National Review, June 17, 2013.

[12] “Iran Hard-Liners Show Strength Over Reformers with Massive Rally,” AP, July 14, 1999.

[13] “Iranian Hard-Liners Take Over the Streets; Crowd May Mean Trouble for Student Reformers,” Orlando Sentinel, July 15, 1999.

[14] “Office of Criminal Investigations AMIA CASE,” Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General, October 25, 2006.

[15] “How We Duped the West, by Iran’s Nuclear Negotiator,” Sunday Telegraph, March 5, 2006.

[16] Ibid.

[17] “A Look at the Iranian Stalemate: They’re Changing. Why Can’t We?,” by Gary Sick, Washington Post, March 28, 1999.

[18] “US Policy Toward Iran: From Containment to Relentless Pursuit,” Middle East Policy Council, May 25, 1995.

[19] Ibid.

[20] “An Update on Iran with Two Experts,” Charlie Rose Show, April 12, 2006.

[21] “Why Does Columbia Host Ahmadinejad?” by Mohammad Parvin and Hassan Daioleslam, September 23, 2007.

The Appeasers

August 21, 2014 by admin

Nazi Germany had its appeasers. So did Mao’s China and the Soviet Union. And today there are appeasers of Iran, an equally suppressive, violent, and intolerant regime. The appeasers are:

Conciliatory to the mullahs and accept their rightful legitimacy as rulers of Iran, as well as Iran’s legitimacy as a regional power.
Whitewash or avoid discussing the mullahs’ history of tyranny, repression, misogynous laws, imprisonment of dissenters, political executions, lack of religious or artistic freedom, cracking down on the media, torture, flogging, etc.
Support the removal of all sanctions on Iran.
Refuse to harshly condemn, or hold accountable, the mullahs for their many human rights violations.
Recognize Iran is developing a nuclear bomb but refuse to support policies of containment.
Decline to hold Iran accountable for its terrorist attacks, one suicide bombing of which killed 19 US servicemen and wounded hundreds of others.
Downplay the regime’s threat to its neighbors and military and financial support it provides to Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups.
Oppose regime change and attack Iranian patriots who seek to restore democracy and freedom in the country.
Take offense when the regime is accurately described with such terms as “rogue state,” “axis of evil,” and “leading sponsor of terrorism.”
Advocate Iran’s threat to its neighbors and the West can be resolved through dialogue.

Want Western leaders to make substantial concessions to the regime and believe, in return, the mullahs will halt their export of Islamic fundamentalism.

Alavi Foundation

August 21, 2014 by admin

Iran would appear to be highly appreciative of Amirahmadi’s support for the regime. Rutgers University, where Amirahmadi works, was the largest recipient of grants by the Alavi Foundation, a non-profit organization secretly controlled by Iran’s mullahs.

A 36-story building on Fifth Avenue in New York City owned by the Foundation generated nearly $40 million in rental income from 1999-2007. Some of the funds were transferred to the Iranian government; other monies were invested in mosques and Islamic centers in the US, and some of the income was directed to student loans and grants to universities.

Over the nine-year period, Alavi distributed $3.1 million to universities, based on IRS filings. Of this total, Rutgers University received $675,100 – nearly 22% of the funds and almost twice the amount given to any other university in the US.

In 2013, a federal judge authorized the seizure of the Aliva building, after determining its owners had violated federal money laundering laws and sanctions against Iran.

The building was constructed in the 1970s by the Pahlavi Foundation, while the Shah was in power. After the ’79 Revolution, its ownership was transferred to the Mostazafan Foundation in New York. The property was 60% owned by the Alavi Foundation and 40% owned by the Assa Corporation, a shell company managed by Iran’s state-owned Bank Melli.

In 2014, US prosecutors unveiled a plan to sell the building and distribute the proceeds to the families of the 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 US military personnel and the 1986 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 US service members – both attacks of which were instigated by Iran.

American-Iranian Council

August 21, 2014 by admin

Hooshang Amirahmadi,[1] a dual US-Iranian citizen and professor at Rutgers University, teamed up in 1997 with America’s largest oil companies to create the American-Iranian Council (AIC), a non-profit organization to promote the removal of US sanctions on Iran.[2]

Amirahmadi had earlier participated in conferences on US-Iran relations and usually presents Tehran’s position.[3] He also often comes to the regime’s defense when it was attacked in news stories.

As an example, in 1994 Amirahmadi admonished US Secretary of State Warren Christopher for labeling Iran an “international outlaw,” following its bombing of a Jewish center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people and injured hundreds others. Christopher said, “Groups like Hezbollah that wreak havoc and bloodshed must be defeated. And Hezbollah’s patron, Iran, must be contained.”[4]

Amirahmadi retorted, “A catch phrase of the nature of ‘outlaw nation’ smacks of a discredited ‘do as we say’ cold-war brand of international policy, not the true diplomacy required in these sensitive times when the United States is, or should be, an equal player on the global stage.”[5]

AIC has been bankrolled by the who’s who of America’s big oil companies, including ARCO, Aramco, Ashland Oil, Conoco, Exxon, Mobil, Shell, and Unocal.

For a brief period it looked as if US oil companies might gain access to Iran’s oil market, but then Congress intervened. In 1995, Conoco – after three years of negotiations – announced it had been awarded a contract by Iran to develop two oil fields in the Persian Gulf.

The news met the disapproval of members of Congress. US Senator D’Amato (R-NY) introduced legislation to block the contract, stating, “We are subsidizing Iranian terrorism by purchasing their oil and it has to stop.”[6]

Since 1984, Iran has been on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Iranian regime views terrorism as a legitimate tool to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. Beginning in the early 1990s, it gained the dubious distinction of being the world’s most active supporter of international terrorism.

Among its many terrorist strikes, Iran instigated the March 1992 suicide bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, which killed 29 people and wounded nearly 250 others. Iran financed Sheik Abdel-Rahman, the blind cleric who masterminded the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City. And the regime was behind the bombing of the Jewish center in Buenos Aires.

Ten days after Conoco announced the contract with Iran, President Clinton signed an executive order banning US investments in the development of petroleum resources in Iran.

US Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff explained in November 1995, “A straight line links Iran’s oil income and its ability to sponsor terrorism, build weapons of mass destruction, and acquire sophisticated armaments. Any government or private company that helps Iran to expand its oil must accept that it is contributing to this menace.”[7]

In 1996, the US enacted legislation – with a five-year sunset clause – that imposed economic sanctions on companies doing business with Iran and Libya.

US oil producers and other businesses were displeased to be shut out of Iran. Working with the National Foreign Trade Council, they established USA*Engage in 1997 to lobby against the “ineffectiveness of unilateral economic foreign policy sanctions.” And they reached out to Hooshang Amirahmadi and helped him establish AIC.

Like other anti-sanction groups, AIC minimizes the military and terrorism threat posed by the Iranian regime. Amirahmadi suggests that all foreign policy conflicts between the US and Iran’s mullahs can be resolved through dialogue.

Amirahmadi completely disavows evidence of Iran’s support of terrorism, as well as terrorist attacks by its surrogates, Hezbollah and Hamas, both of which are on the US State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

Attacks by Hezbollah, according to the State Department include:

[T]he suicide truck bombing of the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the US Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which a US Navy diver was murdered. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping, detention, and murder of Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hezbollah was implicated, along with Iran, in the 1993 attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires…Two other attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers – an attack in late July that wounded six French citizens and a second attack days later that injured three other French soldiers – were believed to have been carried out by Hezbollah. Also in 2011, four Hezbollah members were indicted by the UN-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), an international tribunal investigating the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Mininister Rafik Hariri…On January 12, Thai police detained a Hezbollah operative on immigration charges as he was attempting to depart Thailand from Suvarnabhumi International Airport. He led police to nearly 10,000 pounds of Urea-based fertilizer and 10 gallons of liquid ammonium nitrate in a commercial building about 20 miles south of Bangkok….In 2012, Hezbollah stepped up the pace of its terrorist plotting, and was implicated in several terrorist plots around the world….[8]

Amirahmadi’s response to the many terrorist attacks is to deny they are acts of terrorism. “The problem of terrorism is a true myth,” he said. “Iran has not been involved in any terrorist organization. Neither Hezbollah nor Hamas are terrorist organizations.”[9]

The attacks by Hezbollah and Hamas, according to Amirahmadi, are legitimate “resistance movement” activities and not terrorism. It is the “double understanding of terrorism,” Amirahmadi posits, that “hinders” Iran’s relations with the West.

Amirahmadi’s solution? “I think Iran and Western countries should meet to discuss what they mean byterrorism,” Amirahmadi said. “They should come to an arithmetical meaning in the definition of terrorism.”[10]

[1] Amirahmadi lived and worked in Iran until 1975, and then traveled to the US to attend graduate school.

[2] Amirahmadi founded US-Iran Conference Inc. in 1991 to promote conferences and roundtables on US-Iran relations.

[3] “International Conference on Iran Concludes with Diverse Views of Iran’s Future,” PR Newswire, May 2, 1996.

[4] “Iran and Allies Are Suspected in Bomb Wave,” New York Times, July 29, 1994.

[5] “Demonizing Iran Doesn’t Equal Foreign Policy,” New York Times, August 8, 1994.

[6] “Condemning Iranian Oil Deal, US May Tighten Trade Ban,” New York Times, March 10, 1995.

[7] “Iran Freedom Support Act,” House Committee on International Relations Report, US House of Representatives, April 25, 2006. Also see “Condemning Iranian Oil Deal, US May Tighten Trade Ban,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, March 10, 1995.

[8] “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,” US State Department, April 2014.

[9] “Rewarding Terrorism Denial,” National Review, October 3, 2008.

[10] “US, Iran Must Reach Common Denominator to Fight Terrorism: Experts,” Trend Daily News, May 3, 2009.

Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran

August 21, 2014 by admin

NIAC, CASMII, AIC and other pro-Iranian regime organizations have built close relations with radical leftist and anti-war groups and use them to promote their political agenda.

Abbas Edalat, who founded the Science and Art Foundation (SAF) in 1999 and subsequently helped Trita Parsi establish NIAC, created yet another NGO in December 1, 2005, called the Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention (CASMII).

As its name implies, it was established to oppose sanctions and military intervention in Iran.[1] More importantly, it was designed to reach out to anti-war organizations and persuade them to support the pro-Iran lobby agenda.

Little information is available about Edalat beyond his academic background. Since 1989, he has been a professor of Computer Science and Mathematics at Imperial College in London. He also is an adjunct professor at the Department of Mathematical Sciences at Sharif University in Tehran,[2] and an adjunct professor at the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Niavaran Square, in Tehran.[3] What compelled him to leave Iran and his ongoing connections to the regime are unknown.

When CASMII was founded, three members of its leadership were also board members of NIAC, including:

Alex Patico – co-founder of NIAC.
Mohamad Navab – professor of medicine at UCLA.
Daniel M. Paukessali – an engineer at an electronic instrument company.

Three others who lent their support to CASMII had been board members on Parsi’s earlier NGO, Iranians for International Cooperation (IIC):

Javad Fakherzadeh – founder and board member of Persian Gulf Online.
Shahram Mostarshed – anti-war activist who previously was involved in the Persian Gulf Task Force (PGTF).
Mohammad Ala – founder and a board member of Iran Heritage and Iran Alliance Online. He also is a member of the board of the Persian Gulf.

CASMII claims to be an independent organization, but its political positions echo those of the Iranian regime. For its extreme bias, the organization has been dubbed a “regime cheerleader” for Iran, a “propagandist mouthpiece,” and a “Mullah Supporter in the West.”

To influence policy, CASMII stated it planned to lobby “members of parliament and opinion-makers,” work in close collaboration with groups sharing similar views, and hold public meeting to highlight “relevant issues and to provide a critique of the increasingly belligerent threats against Iran.”[4]

CASMII and NIAC have collaborated on various projects. As an example, they co-authored a letter in October 2007, titled “Give Diplomacy of Chance – Say No to Military Conflict?” which was sent to officials in Iran, UK, and US.[5]

In November 2006, CASMII joined Action Iran and Iran Solidarity to create Campaign Iran. Typical of its publications “Answering the Charges,” a document riddled with falsehoods about the Iranian regime. CASMII claimed Iran had not blocked any inspections for more than a year:

“Iran has fully complied with International Atomic Energy inspections. They signed the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and for most of the last three years have allowed inspectors “to go anywhere and see anything.”[6]

Hassan Rouhani, then Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, announced in October 2003 that Iran would sign the Additional Protocol to allow unfettered access to its nuclear sites. But after signing the document, he then announced it had to be ratified by the Majles (parliament). To this day, the document has not been ratified and the IAEA has yet to have unfettered access to go anywhere and see anything in Iran.

Leadership

Many people once identified with CASMII no longer appear active. At one time, CASMII had a Steering Committee, US Board of Directors, Advisory Board, and Academic Advisory Board. The organization’s website has stopped displaying a list of CASMII’s leaders. Below are current and past leaders of CASMII.[7]

Steering Committee

Abbas Edalat	The founder of CASMII and a member of its US Board of Directors. He also sits on the Steering Committee of the Stop the War Coalition.
Mohammad Kamaali	He founded Patrix LLP (previously known as Javan Systems), a London-based company that hosted Iranian government websites, such as the Iranian Embassy’s website in Britain and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, an Iranian political party.[8]
Mohamad Navab	A professor of medicine at UCLA. (Resigned position in August 2007)
Shirin Saeidi	Born in Iran, she grew up in the West and believes intellectuals are the “frontline protectors of Iranian sovereignty” and is opposed to the “American empire.”
Mehrnaz Shahabi	An Iranian now living in Bristol, she describes herself as an “anti-war activist and independent researcher.” She also calls herself as a “psycho-social researcher.”
Reza Shirazi	A radical, anti-Semite who described America as “true blood suckers who have looted the whole world.” He believes the US “has no right to be in [the] [M]iddle [E]ast and loot the oil.”[9] On his facebook profile, under “likes,” he listed former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and PressTV, Iran’s state-run propaganda channel. He also was listed as a member of the Advisory Board and the US Board of Directors.
Phil Wilayto	He is the editor of the Richmond Defender, a quarterly, far-left publication allied with anti-war groups published in Richmond, Virginia. Wilayto is affiliated with the Marxist World Workers Party. He attended Mount Carmel College for one year and Boston College for two years. He is a Marxist and editor for the Richmond Defender, a quarterly, far-left publication allied with anti-war groups.

Advisory Board

Kaveh L. Afrasiabi	He traveled with Iranian then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the United Nations in 2010. Previously, he worked in Tehran at the Center for Strategic Research, a think tank established by now-President Hassan Rouhani.
Mohammad Ala	He is the founder and board member of Iran Heritage and Iran Alliance Online. He is also a board member of the Persian Gulf.
Javad Fakharzadeh	Founder and board member of Persian Gulf Online.
Betty Molchany	She was an attorney with American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC).
Shahram Mostarshed	An anti-war activist previously involved with Iranians for International Cooperation (IIC) and Persian Gulf Task Force (PGTF).
Behrad Nakhai	A nuclear engineer who worked at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, he was personally invited in 1998 by then Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to study Iran’s nuclear program. He also was listed until 2007 as a member of the US Board of Directors for CASMII.

US Board of Directors

Niki Akhavan	An activist and board member of the US chapter of the Campaign Against Sanctions.
Abbas Edalat	See above.
Foaad Khosmood	He is an anti-war organizer and writer.
Alax Patico	He is a cofounder of NIAC.
Daniel Pourkesali	Born in Babol, a city in northern Iran, he moved to the US in 1978, after graduating from high school. He received a BS in aeronautical engineering from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, FL. He is a member of NIAC, the Persian Gulf Organization, and IIC. He also was listed as a member of the US Board of Directors for CASMII.
Rostam Pourzal	The head of CASMII’s branch in the US.A social scientist, he retired from business in 2001 to work fulltime as a researcher and activist in Washington, DC.
Ali R. Rabi	An Iranian academic who relocated to the US, and founding chairman of the Middle East Citizens Assembly and a board member of the Iran-America Peace Forum.
Nader Sadeghi	A physician at George Washington University.
Reza Shirazi	See Steering Committee members.

In August 2008, CASMII announced an Academic Advisory Board.[10] Its members included:

Behrooz Abdolvand, Free University of Berlin w Martin Baraki, University of Marburg w Reiner Barun, a managing director at the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms w Joachim Guilliard, political scientist w Ali Fathollah-Nejad, an “Iran expert” w Mohssen Massarrat, development researcher w Werner Ruf, a peace and conflict researcher w Ahad Rahmanzadeh, University of Bonn w Yvonne Schmidt, University of Graz w Arne Seifer, spokesman for Diplomats for Peace with the Islamic World w Albert Stahel, University of Zurich w and Udo Steinback, director of the German Institute for Middle East Studies.

[1] CASMII does not condemn Iran’s military interference in neighboring countries.

[2] The Institute was created in 1989 by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (IEOI) as a training facility for nuclear scientists. It previously was called the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics, also known as the Jabit bin al-Hayyan Laboratory. While the Institute is not believed to be directly involved in Iran’s nuclear weapons program, it does train others who are conducting such activities.

[3] (bio on Imperial College)

[4] www.campaigniran.org

[5] http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/?q=node/3048

[6] Answering the Charges, www.campaigniran.org

[7] http://archive.today/Q5FvI#selection-3921.0-4203.1

[8] The Iranian Embassy’s website in Britain, the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, an Iranian political party, and a website for the Iranian Ministry of Science, Research & Technology.

[9] Reza Shirazi’s internet handle is goftogootv.

[10] http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/?q=node/7606

Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador

August 21, 2014 by admin

Trita Parsi has had close working relationship with Javad Zarif, when he was Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations. In a deposition, Parsi stated he only communicated in 2006 with Zarif in order to “interview him.” But this is not true.
Emails made public demonstrate that Parsi and Zarif collaborated on numerous political issues. Parsi publicly distributed an Iranian regime document to influence US policy. He made arrangements for the ambassador to participate in a conference on Capitol Hill and to meet members of Congress, and sought the ambassador’s council regarding the feasibility of a new Persian Gulf security arrangement.
About the collusion between Parsi and Zarif, a former Associate Deputy Director of the FBI said Parsi should have been registered as a foreign agent of Iran. Arizona Senator Jon Kyl contacted the US Justice Department, urging an investigation of Parsi.

It is not known when and how Parsi first met Javad Zarif, Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations (2002-2007) in New York City. Zarif currently is Iran’s Foreign Minister.

Their association dates back at least to 2003, according to a report NIAC sent to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). In the document, NIAC stated it had a relationship with Zarif “due to personal contacts between Dr. Zarif and NIAC’s Acting President, Trita Parsi.”[1]

Emails and dates of meetings between Parsi and Zarif were made public during the defamation lawsuit filed by Parsi and NIAC against Daioleslam Seif Hassan. In the discovery process, Parsi was required to hand over all of his calendar entries. For 2006, there was a five-month gap in which there are no entries.

In the available emails, both Parsi and Zarif used private email addresses to communicate. Zarif’s address was zarif@141.com. The domain name, 141.com, was registered in 1996 at eName Technology, located in Xiamen, China. The company conceals registration information, which likely accounts for its many links to illicit domain names.

Parsi communicated with Zarif from his university email account (tparsi@jhu.edu) and later his personal address (tp@tritaparsi.com) rather than his NIAC address (tparsi@niacouncil.com). Parsi also used a private email account when communicating with Siamak Namazi.

The emails and meeting dates made public are from 2006 and 2007. While obvious gaps exist in the communications, it’s possible to gain an understanding of Parsi’s relationship with Zarif and their collaboration on political issues.

Parsi traveled to New York City numerous times to meet Zarif. Had their relationship been casual and their discussions cursory, it’s unlikely Parsi would have made so many trips to New York. Meeting together facilitated their ability to discuss issues in detail, as well as ensured their confidentiality.

Below are the dates of emails exchanged between Parsi and Zarif and known meetings in New York City in 2006-07:

Date	Event	Date	Event
March 16, 2006	email	October 12, 2006	meeting in NYC
March 28, 2006	meeting in NYC	October 26, 2006	3 emails
March 29, 2006	2 emails	February 6, 2007	2 emails
March 30, 2006	email	February 16, 2007	2 emails
May 19, 2006	email	February 23, 2007	meeting in NYC
June 1, 2006	likely meeting in NYC	April 3, 2007	meeting in NYC
August 23, 2006	email	April 16, 2007	meeting in NYC
September 28, 2006	email	October 12, 2007	meeting in NYC
October 10, 2006	email

Parsi’s email to Zarif on March 16, 2006 confirms their personal relationship. Parsi updated Zarif on his graduate studies and indicated he wanted to get together, mentioning minimal details. In the email, Parsi stated:

Dear Ambassador,

I hope this message finds you well. I wanted to let you know that I have finished my PhD on Israel and Iran and am currently writing a book on this topic for Yale University Press.

I wanted to see if I could visit you in NY later in March or April to discuss some of the latest developments on this issue.

Very much look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Trita Parsi[2]
Twelve days after forwarding the email, Parsi met Zarif in New York City (March 28). Parsi thanked Zarif for the meeting. From the email, it is evident they talked about more than Iran-Israel relations:

Thank you so much for the meeting yesterday. I need to clarify a few points before I discuss the spring03 issue. Would you prefer to do this per email or should I call you? tp[3]

The “spring03 issue” refers to a document Zarif provided to Parsi. In the spring of 2003, the US received from the Swiss Embassy in Tehran a proposal dubbed the “Grand Bargain.” The document presented a “roadmap” to negotiate policy issues between Iran and the US. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said US intelligence investigated the overture and did not find “consonance” with face-to-face discussions with “high-ranking Iranian intelligence people.”[4] The US State Department had seen “dozens of such proposals in the past” that were without merit and it was skeptical of the document from Iran.[5] As a result, it was not given much weight.

A second version of the Grand Bargain document, known as the “American version,” supposedly originated in the US instead of Iran. As the story goes, it was transmitted received by Sadegh Kharazi, Iranian Ambassador to France, on April 27, 2003. The document was brought to the attention of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, who then “asked Ambassador Zarif to make amendments to the proposal and return it.”[6] The exact source of the document was unknown, although Iran is said to believe it “most likely” originated from Armitage.[7]

Returning to the emails, about an hour after sending the thank-you message to Zarif, Parsi forwarded a second email to clarify issues discussed during their New York meeting. Parsi’s questions refer to the American version of the Grand Bargain document:

Who was the deliverer of the proposal and how was it communicated that it was from Amitage?
In your view, what prompted the US to make such a proposal at that time?
Exactly when was the proposal sent to you? Did you receive it directly or was it first sent to another Iranian officer?
Did you respond to it directly or after consultations with Tehran?
When was a response sent to DC and how? Directly or through middle man? If later, who?
What was [the] response from [the] US side? Did the US communicate anything at all? If not, why not?
What was the reaction to Iran to the American response/non-response? How did it affect Iranian perceptions of American intentions?
How should I refer to you when talking to my contact?
Do you want me to give the contact a quote from you upfront or later?[8]

Given the questions above, it is clear that Parsi was confused by the document provided by Zarif. Parsi wanted details on the document’s pedigree and guidance on related issues. Parsi’s question, “How should I refer to you when talking to my contact?” indicates Parsi will be meeting with a contact about the document from Zarif.

Parsi’s next question, “Do you want me to give the contact a quote from you upfront or later?” would indicate the contact is with the media. That Zarif would allow Parsi to provide a quote is evidence the two men are closely associated and the Ambassador’s trust in Parsi to speak on his behalf.

Zarif responded to Parsi’s email later the same day, stating, “Either way is fine. I saw your interview on BBC. Great.” This email confirms their collaboration and the Ambassador’s eagerness to work together with Parsi. The next day, on March 30, 2006, Zarif forwarded another email to Parsi about the “spring03 issue”:

I guess we need to talk.

I was not the Iranian official who received the proposal. I got it from the Foreign Minister, who asked me to comment and prepare a reply, and told me that it had come through an intermediary from Armitage.

The claims and counter claims about the source of the proposals and motivations of intermediaries remain a mystery for me.

What I think is important is the fact that Iran was prepared.[9]

In the days that followed, Parsi made contact with Gareth Porter, an anti-war activist who regularly publishes articles sympathetic to Iran on the website “antiwar.com.”[10] Parsi briefed him about the Grand Bargain issue and provided him with the America version of the document. On May 24, 2006, Inter Press Service (IPS) distributed a news story by Porter about the Grand Bargain. He wrote:

“Trita Parsi, a specialist on Iranian foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies who provided the document to IPS, says he got it from an Iranian official earlier this year but is not at liberty to reveal the source.”[11] [emphasis added]

Parsi confirmed in a deposition that he received the copy of the Grand Bargain document from Zarif. In the deposition he was asked:

Who is the Iranian official you mention in this article [by Garth Porter] that gave you the document but who you were not at liberty to say?[12]

Parsi responded:

This is Ambassador Javad Zarif who gave me a version of a document that I already had, and I had shown that I had it to him.[13]

That Parsi previously may have obtained a version of the Grand Bargain document is irrelevant. Of importance is the timing of the decision to make the issue public and release of the document.

In January 2006, Iran had begun again to enrich uranium. In response, the UN Security Council started discussions on imposing economic sanctions against Iran. Facing the possibility of new sanctions, Iran unexpectedly announced on March 18 it would accept an offer for dialogue with the US regarding issues in Iraq. Several months earlier, Zalmay Khalilzad, US ambassador to Iraq, had received the go-ahead from President Bush to engage in direct talks with Iran on subduing militants in Iraq and securing the country.

Iran’s sudden interest in talks with the US was viewed as a ruse by many, including The Washington Post, which said, “By drawing the Bush administration into talks about Iraq, the Iranians give themselves a shot at splintering or distracting the fragile coalition [UN Security Council members] that may be forming in New York.”[14] In Tehran, officials were already indicating that potential talks with the US would likely expand to nuclear issues in Iran.

By publicly releasing the Grand Bargain document and background story, credence was given to Iran’s overture that it was serious in entering into a dialogue with the US. Parsi directly colluded in this process, thereby bolstering Iran’s propaganda campaign to influence US policymakers, in a strategy the mullahs’ hoped would derail new economic sanctions.

During this same period, Parsi and Porter agreed to work together on a venture called the Iranian Negotiation Project. On May 12, 2006, Parsi sent an email to Porter with an attached Excel spreadsheet with budget details about the project. The proposed budget was $99,810. As Project Director, Parsi would be paid $4,600/month and Porter, a Communication Advisor, would receive $5,000/month. The Project was to extend for nine months, from June 2006 through March 2007.

Parsi’s email to Porter is the only document available about the Project. Its goal appears to dovetail Iran’s objective to convince US officials to enter negotiations and sideline further sanctions.

Parsi and Porter collaborated on two additional occasions. On June 21, 2006, Parsi, Porter and David Robinson of Pax Christi were the featured speakers at a Congressional Progressive Caucus meeting titled, “Would War with Iran Help or Hurt US National Security?”

On July 24, 2006, NIAC released an issue brief co-authored by Parsi and Porter on Iran’s involvement in the War in Lebanon. Regarding the Negotiation Project, it appears to have never gotten off the ground.

Returning to the emails between Parsi and Zarif, on May 19 Parsi contacted Zarif to request his participation in a conference on Capitol Hill. Parsi additionally mentioned his work with the Strategic Assessments Initiative (SAI), a nonprofit organization that provided “legal and policy advice and guidance to parties negotiating in conflict and post-conflict situations.”[15]

Parsi said he and SAI were working “with regional governments to enhance the feasibility of a new Persian Gulf security arrangement.”

In particular, we will be working in DC to create stronger support for such an arrangement. Clearly, we need to work with the regional governments, and I would like to hold some preliminary talks with you about this, if possible.[16]

The email demonstrates Parsi’s interest in further collaboration with Zarif on another foreign policy issue. Parsi said in the email he would be in New York on June 1 and wanted to speak with Zarif on the above issues at that time, if possible.

On August 23, 2006, Parsi sent another email to Zarif, this time about a new Iranian proposal to resolve the standoff over its nuclear program. Parsi wrote:

Hope all is well and that you are back from Tehran. Would love to get a chance to see the proposal or to understand more what it entails. If it is substantial, then certainly members of Congress may find it a reasonable offer, even if the White House doesn’t. tp[17]

In late September 2006, Parsi emailed a copy of an AP news article to Zarif about John Bolton, then US Ambassador to the UN. The article said the US Senate would likely not vote on Bolton’s nomination, which would mean he would have to leave the UN at the end of his recess appointment. Bolton is an outspoken opponent of Iran’s mullahs and its nuclear program. His likely departure from the UN was good news for Iran and Parsi wanted to share the information with Zarif.

The following months, Parsi acted as an intermediary to set up meetings between Zarif and members of Congress. In an October 25, 2006 email, Parsi said, “happy to hear you will meet with [Congressman] Gilchrest and potentially [Congressman] Leach.” He continued:

There are many more that are interested in a meeting, including many respectable Democrats. Due to various reasons, they will contact you directly….There large goal is to meet with Iranian elected parliamentarians.[18]

Parsi concluded his email with an offer to assist the ambassador. “Let me know if I can be any further help,” he says.

On the following day, Parsi sent an email to Zarif to inquire if he had been contacted by Congressman Maurice Hinchey. Zanif got back to Parsi, saying “Hinchey has not called yet. I met him a few years ago.”[19]

Zarif forwards a second email to Parsi about a resolution and statements by Lavrov. About the meetings with members of Congress, the Ambassador says, “I am always open to these meetings. Your help is always welcome. I leave the modalities to your discretion.”

Zarif concluded his tenure as Ambassador to the UN in 2007. In an email in early February 2007, Parsi said he was saddened by the news of Zarif’s return to Tehran. “Would love to get a chance to see you one more time before you leave,” Parsi said. “Will coordinate with Mrs. Kamali to get on your schedule.”[20]

Parsi informed Zarif about a book John Limbert was writing on Iranian negotiation behavior. He said Limbert wanted to interview him. Minutes later Parsi dispatched another email to Javid, asking “can I forward him your private email and have you two settle details.”[21] [emphasis added]

Ten days later, Parsi asked Zarif if he had time for a meeting the following Friday. He continued:

I am having a meeting with [Congressmen Wayne] Gilchrest and [Gregory] Meeks, and they asked for our assistance in getting some communication going between the parliamentarians.[22] [emphasis added]

The email is yet another example of Parsi’s collaboration with the Iranian ambassador.

There is a four-month gap in emails between Parsi and Zarif. On June 14, 2007, Parsi sent the outgoing ambassador the following message:

Salaam – yes, they are all well. Thank you. And you? I hope all is well. Yes, I will attend the good bye party, and wanted to see if I also could schedule a meeting with you and the [new] Ambassador that same day to follow up on previous discussions? tp[23]

Before Zarif departed from New York City, Parsi had two meetings with his top assistant, Gholam Hossein Mohammadnia, presumably to ensure a continuation of Parsi’s working relationship with the Iranian mission at the UN. On October 12, 2007, Parsi met the new Iranian ambassador to the UN, Mohammad Khazaei.

Parsi claimed in a deposition he went to New York only to interview the ambassador. He was asked the question:

Now, with regard to Ambassador Zarif, did you have any other conversations with him during this five-month period in the middle of 2006 for which you have no calendar entries?[24]

Parsi answered:

I had e-mail exchanges, and on numerous occasions, I had the opportunity to interview him.[25]

Parsi’s statement is not true. The emails he exchanged with Zarif demonstrate their relationship involved far more than interviews and, in fact, they collaborated on numerous issues. Parsi did not once state in any available email to Zarif that the purpose of his visit was to interview the ambassador.

Parsi and Zarif kept each other informed on political issues and likely conferred on a new Persian Gulf security arrangement. They colluded to make public the Grand Bargain document that benefited the Iranian regime. Parsi organized Zarif’s participation in a conference on Capitol Hill and helped make arrangements for the ambassador to meet members of Congress.

Oliver “Buck” Revell, former Associate Deputy Director of the FBI, reviewed the emails between Parsi and Zarif and said.

Arranging meetings between members of Congress and Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations would in my opinion require that person or entity to register as an agent of a foreign power; in this case it would be Iran.[26]

Kenneth Piernick, a former FBI special agent in counterintelligence and counterterrorism, said about the activities between Parsi and Zarif:

It appears that this [Parsi’s actions] may be lobbying on behalf of Iranian government interests. Were I running the counterintelligence program at the bureau now, I would have cause to look into this further.[27]

In November 2009, Arizona Senator Jon Kyl forwarded a Washington Times article about Parsi’s involvement with Zarif (“Iran Advocacy Group Said to Skirt Lobby Rules”) to the attention of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and asked it to respond to the following questions:

Is DOJ investigating the allegations put forward in this article? If not, why?

Has DOJ found the allegations in this article to be true?
What is the proper recourse against a 501(c)(3) group that engages in lobbying activities on behalf of a foreign government without registering as a lobbyist or filing papers with DOJ indicating the group is a local agent of a foreign government?[28]

No information has been made public on the DOJ’s response, if any. NIAC was never investigated.

[1] “Periodic Report on National Endowment for Democracy Financial and Program Activities for Grant #202-362 Video and Media Training Workshops in Iran,” National Iranian American Council, January 31, 2003.

[2] www.iranlobby.com

[3] Ibid.

[4] PBS Interview with Richard Armitage, July 12, 2007. http://www.pbs.org/wghb/pages/frontline/showdown/ interviews/armitage.html

[5] “Did Iran Offer a ‘Grand Pargain’ in 2003?” by Steven J. Rosen, American Thinker, November 16, 2008.

[6] Treacherous Alliance, Trita Parsi, Yale University Press, 2007.

[7] Ibid.

[8] www.iranlobby.com

[9] www.iranlobby.com

[10] The NGO, Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran (CASMII), was established in December 2005, to link anti-war groups with NIAC and other pro-Iran organizations. This effort may have led to Parsi’s contact with Gareth Porter and antiwar.com.

[11] “Iran Proposal to US Offered Peace with Israel,” Gareth Porter, Inter Press Service, May 24, 2006.

[12] Deposition of Dr. Trita Parsi, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 08 CV 00705 (JDB), December 1, 2010.

[13] Ibid.

[14] “Why Iran Wants to Talk,” Editorial, Washington Post, March 18, 2006.

[15] www.strategicassessments.org

[16] www.iranlobby.com

[17] www.iranlobby.com

[18] www.iranlobby.com

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] www.iranlobby.com

[23] Ibid.

[24] Deposition of Dr. Trita Parsi, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 08 CV 00705 (JDB), December 1, 2010.

[25] Ibid.

[26] “Iran Advocacy Group Said to Skirt Lobby Rules,” Eli Lake, Washington Times, November 13, 2009.

[27] Ibid.

[28] http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/1109/Kyl_presses_for_NIAC_inquiry.html

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Survey
Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
Defamation Lawsuit
People’s Mojahedin
Trita Parsi Biography
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader

Namazi, NIAC Ringleader

August 21, 2014 by admin

Trita Parsi traveled with Siamak Namazi to Isfahan, Iran’s third largest city, in August 2000. They also toured the Zoroastrian “Fire of Victory” Temple in Yazd.
At the time, Siamak was living in Tehran, working for Atieh Bahar, a consultant company with close ties to the government.
In 1999, Parsi and Siamak co-authored a paper that recommended setting up a lobbying organization in Washington to influence US-Iran policy. Siamak took a sabbatical in 2005 to complete a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. While at the Center, Siamak helped Parsi formulate NIAC policies supportive of the Iranian regime.

In June 2001, just months after Parsi relocated to the US to begin work as Director of Development at the American-Iranian Council (AIC), he began formulating a plan to set up his own Washington-based NGO.

Assisting Parsi in the process was Siamak’s father, Baquer, who had established the NGO, Hamyaran, in Iran and had facilitated the participation of Parsi and Siamak at the Cypress conference in 1999.

Also involved in creating the new NGO was Abbas Edalat, an Iranian academic working in the UK who in 1999 had established the Science & Arts Foundation (SAF), an NGO to provide computers and internet services in schools in Iran.[1] In 2005 he founded the Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran (CASMII), another NGO, to entice anti-war groups to support the mullahs’ political agenda.

Details of Parsi’s involvement with Baquer and Edalat were made public during the defamation lawsuit filed by Parsi and NIAC against Hassan Daioleslam in 2008.

The first available Parsi email, dated June 17, 2001, was sent to four Iranian Americans, all affiliated to Edalat’s SAF organization, and a US lawyer, about an upcoming conference call to discuss the structure of the new NGO. SAF had attracted many prominent and successful Iranian Americans who, in turn, were asked to assist Parsi set up the political NGO in Washington. The four Iranian Americans are:

Payman Ababshahi – senior research scientist at the University of Washington’s Applied Physics Laboratory.
Esmail Ghorbani – electrical engineer and founder of Enginuity Search.
Susan Tahmasebi – women’s rights and civil society activist.
Fereydoun Taslimi – Chief Technology Officer at PerformanceIT and founder of Informatics Sciences.

The lawyer, Brian L. Oliner, founded the charity, Children of Persia. In the June 17^th email, Parsi listed five issues he wanted to discuss:

Lift sanctions or grant exemption for non-profits?

501C3 or Not?
Extent of cooperation with other groups.
When to go public?
Importance of doing the groundwork in Congress.

Parsi said a “key decision” for the group was whether the new NGO should lobby to lift all economic sanctions on Iran or “simply lobby for an exemption for non-profits.” Parsi then lectured the Iranian Americans, misinforming them about the politics behind the sanctions. Parsi said:

It is important to keep the following in mind: The main purpose of the sanctions are not to halt Iran’s alleged attempts to acquire WMDs or halt its alleged support to terrorist groups. The main purpose is to constitute a political obstacle to a US-Iran dialogue and improved US-Iran dialogue and improved US-Iran relations. From the Israeli perspective (the sole force behind the lobby efforts to impose and now extend the sanctions), every step Washington takes toward Tehran is a step away from Tel Aviv.[2]

Parsi told the Iranian Americans the new NGO should have the ability to lobby every member of Congress:

In order to be successful, we must have the resources to meet with all offices on the Hill (app.535). We should be careful about giving the impression of being able to successfully carry through with our mission until we have gathered the necessary sources. [emphasis added][3]

After their conference call, Parsi distributed an email with the minutes of their conversation. During the call, the Iranian Americans said they preferred the NGO initially lobby for an exemption for non profits, rather than the removal of all sanctions.

Parsi and Edalat disagreed. On June 23, 2001, Parsi sent an email to the group, supporting Edalat’s proposal to have the NGO both lobby to remove sanctions, as well as seek an exemption for non-profits. Parsi wrote:

I think Prof. Edalat is right on point. Combining the two goals will also enable us to work with allies both within and outside Congress who perhaps would oppose an effort to just get the NGO exemption, as such a move might make the lifting of the sanctions altogether more difficult.[4]

Parsi discussed the contents of the minutes from their conference call.

There has been silence since the draft minutes of last week’s telephone conference was sent to the group for your review and approval. I assume everyone has been busy, but it would be good if we could finish the minutes by Tuesday so that we can follow Mr. Ba[qu]er Namazi’s instructions and sen[d] it to Amb. Bill Miller.[5] [emphasis added]

The email reveals that Baquer Namazi is the ringleader of the group, giving instructions to Parsi and the others. Parsi is thus working with Namazi, who has close ties to the Iranian regime, and whose family members work for one of the top consulting companies in Tehran with multiple links to government officials and ministries.

The email indicates Parsi also was working with William G. Miller, then an advisor for the Search for Common Ground and a member of the board of the American Iranian Council. He earlier had been a political officer at the US Consulate in Isfahan (1959-62) and Embassy in Tehran (1962-64).

On June 25, 2001, Parsi sent an email to Fereydoun Taslimi, one of the four Iranian Americans,

regarding the minutes of the conference call, which was copied to the other members of the group. Taslimi was not pleased with the draft minutes and wanted changes.

Parsi acknowledged to Taslimi that the group preferred to restrict lobbying for the new NGO to the removal of sanctions on non-profits:

Your point on giving NGO exemption priority is well taken. In the minutes, it currently states that a majority favors that but that we also saw the need for more research. That is my understanding of our meeting, please correct me if I am mistaken.[6]

Parsi said he would “add text regarding the [group’s] wish to keep things loose without an official organization, my apologies for forgetting to emphasize that more.” He also attempted to persuade the group to change their position, stating, “Few Congressmen will support a 1-3 (sic) loosely organized charitable organizations (sic) that are (sic) not even allowed to lobby in the first place.”[7]

Additional emails are unavailable to explain what happened next. When Parsi announced the establishment of NIAC in the spring of 2002, the four Iranian Americans who had participated in the discussions of its agenda were nowhere to be seen.

Two of the Iranian Americans – Abranshahi and Tahmasebi – were later named officers of the SAF branch in Maryland, along with Edalat.

Siamak Namazi’s brother in law, Bijan Khajdhpour, who is the head of Atieh International, became the Chairman of the Board of Trustees at SAF.
[1] Edalat set up a branch in New York City in 1999 and another branch in Rockville, Maryland, in 2003.

[2] Email from Trita Parsi, Conference Call material, June 17, 2001.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Email from Trita Parsi, Re: Conference Call minutes, June 23, 2001.

[5] Email from Trita Parsi, Re: Conference Call minutes, June 23, 2001.

[6] http://www.iranian-americans.com/docs/ned1/conferenceCall.pdf

[7] Ibid.

Read more about NIAC:

Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime

August 21, 2014 by admin

It’s unclear how and when Parsi first met Siamak Namazi. An article in the Washington Times said they initially got together in 1996, when Parsi “was a student in Sweden.”[1]

This may be true but, as previously discussed above, Parsi has deliberately avoided all mention of his undergraduate education in his CVs and other biography materials. Where and when he went to undergraduate school is unclear.

Siamak in 1996 was in Tehran for awhile, completing his military service, and then returned to the US to begin graduate studies at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Siamak, born in Iran on October 14, 1971, left the country with his family when he was 12. In the years that followed, he would move 11 times in 18 years, experiencing a wide range of cultures, from Nairobi, Kenya, to White Plains, New York.

After completing an undergraduate degree at Tufts University in Boston, Siamak was offered a position with an NGO in Cairo, Egypt, where his father worked. Siamak declined the job and instead traveled to Tehran in 1994 to complete compulsory military duty. Most Iranians who oppose the regime refuse to serve in its military or they make a payment in lieu of the requirement.

Siamak volunteered to return to Iran. He remained there for two and a half years, serving as a duty officer at the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning.

No public information could be located on Parsi’s participation, payment, or avoidance of the regime’s compulsory military duty.

Maybe Parsi and Siamak met while they both were in Iran. Parsi did not travel to the US until the summer of 1997, when he went to work as an intern for then Congressman Robert Ney. If Parsi and Siamak didn’t meet in Iran, where did they cross paths?

What is known is that they share a sympathetic view toward the Iranian regime and had a common interest in organizing Iranian expats to influence US governmental policies to remove the sanctions in Iran.

Parsi returned to Sweden after finishing his internship in August 1997. Siamak concluded his graduate degree at Rutgers in 1998. While at the university, he occasionally published an article for Iranian.com, an Iranian community website founded in 1995.

In 1998 article, Siamak said Iranian-Americans should study and better understand the American political system “in order to influence it.”[2] He applauded the creation of Parsi’s NGO, Iranians for International Cooperation (IIC), and said Iranian-Americans needed to add their “cultural values and ideas to the American political landscape.”[3]

Siamak said “Iran stands to gain substantially should its expatriate population hold decision-making power in foreign lands.”[4] [emphasis added] The assimilation and naturalization of the Iranian expatriate population, he said, was “in accordance with the long-term interests of Iran.”[5] [emphasis added]

Siamak asked readers to “picture the mood in the US Congress with Senators of Iranian origin.” He asked rhetorically, “Could France have sold the sophisticated technology it did to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (sic) if the French foreign ministry housed influential French-Iranian?”[6]

Atieh Bahar

Atieh Bahar (AB) is a influential consultancy firm in Iran with close ties and partnerships with the government.

AB was founded in 1993 by Pari Namazi, Siamak’s sister, and her husband, Bijan Khajehpour. The company’s legal division is headed by Babak Namazi, Siamak’s brother.

AB provides market research, public affairs, recruitment, market intelligence, business strategies, and legal assistance to companies in Iran and others looking to enter the market.

AB also contracts with government ministries and banks, as well as direct and indirect partnerships with energy and telecom companies.

Albrecht Frischenschlager, an AB Director, manages FTZ Services, a joint venture with three government free zones in Iran. His partner at Middle East Strategies is Hatami Yazd, the former head of the Bank of Saderat Iran, the country’s second largest bank. This bank and two others affiliated with Hatami are under US sanctions.

Siamak statement and question are revealing. During the early years of the war, France was aligned with Arab nations and much of the rest of the world, including the United States, in opposing Khomeini’s Iran, which sought to topple Saddam’s regime and replace it with an Islamic republic. Siamak implies France would have been blocked from supplying arms to Iraq had French-Iranians been in the foreign ministry. In other words, France would not have aligned with the West but in support of Iran’s ruling mullahs. Siamak identifies with the Iranian regime and opposes the West.

After finishing graduate school, Siamak set up a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. called Future Alliance International (FAI) to promote business opportunities in Iran. The idea likely originated from Siamak’s sister, Pari, and her husband, Bijan Khajeh Pour, who had returned to Iran in 1993 to set up a consulting firm, called Atieh Bahar, to assist foreign companies enter the Iranian market. Atieh Bahar has been highly successful due to its close ties to former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and government ministries.

In 1998, Siamak’s father set up the NGO, Hamyaran, to monitor and control other Iranian NGOs and international organizations operating in Iran.

Siamak and Parsi presented their paper at the conference in Cypress in 1999. At the time, Siamak was likely living in Tehran. What is known is that he moved in 1999 to Iran to begin work at Atieh Bahar.

Parsi founded NIAC in 2002 and began work on a Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins University. During this time, Atieh Bahar hired Parsi to write a newsletter. Parsi acknowledged he produced about 15 newsletters for the Iranian consulting company.[7]

Soon after establishing NIAC, Parsi applied for a $25,000 grant from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to produce a video and media training workshop in Iran. Non-Iranian groups are required to partner with an Iranian NGO for projects in Iran. It also has to be approved by Iran’s Foreign Ministry.

NIAC Collaborations with Atieh BaharOver the years, NIAC and Atieh Bahar have often collaborated Biajan Khajehpour, the head of AB, has appeared on panel discussions sponsored by NIAC, including:

Khajehpour was a panelist at the NIAC Leadership Conference in 2012.

Parsi moderated a NIAC panel discussion on “Assessing the Iran Nuclear Talks” in May 2012 that featured Khajahpour.

Khajehpour was a panelist on the NIAC “Hill Briefing,” titled “Rouhani Election Presents West with Golden Opportunity.”

Parsi and Khajehpour have also appeared jointly at other conferences. They were panelists at the Atlantic Council conference, “Changing Iran’s ‘Great Satan’ Narrative” in December 2013.

In March 2013, Parsi authored a 30-page report with Khajehpour and Reza Marshi on economic sanctions imposed on Iran.

NIAC met with an official at the Ministry and with Hamyaran, the NGO established by Siamak’s father, to discuss acceptable NGO partners. Not surprisingly, the project was approved by the regime and NAIC received the grant from NED, providing much needed financial resources for the newly formed NGO. In subsequent years, NIAC received nearly $200,000 in NED grants.

In 2005, Siamak took a sabbatical from Atieh Bahar to participate in a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC.[8] While at the Center, Siamak worked with Parsi to formulate policies at NIAC.

As evidence, in November 2005, Siamak sent an email to Parsi, suggesting an agenda for an upcoming meeting. He proposed they “develop a common list of policy recommendation[s] to enhance our ability to influence decision-makers.”[9] [emphasis added] In another email, Siamak told Parsi:

“[W]e need to carve out time to work on our discussion with [US Secretary] Burns. If you have any policy papers I can look at, I could also start working on one for [Steven] Hadley’s office [He was National Security Advisor to President George Bush]. Once a draft is available, we can get input from our network and make it stronger.”[10] [emphasis added]

These and other emails exchanged between Siamak and Parsi demonstrate Siamak’s close involvement in shaping policies at NIAC, as well as Parsi’s collaboration with the regime-linked consulting firm, Atieh Bahar.

[1] “Iran Advocacy Group Said to Skirt Lobby Rules,” Washington Times, November 13, 2009.

[2] “If Mahdi Doesn’t Come,” by Siamak Namazi, The Iranian, November 9, 1998.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Deposition of Dr. Trita Parsi, Trita Parsi and National Iranian American Council v. Daioleslam Seid Hassan, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 08 CV 00705 (JDB), December 1, 2010.

[8] In 2013, the Center published a report by Siamak, titled “Sanctions and Medical Supply Shortages in Iran.”

[9] www.iranlobby.com

[10] www.iranlobby.com

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Survey
Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
Defamation Lawsuit
People’s Mojahedin
Trita Parsi Biography
Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador

Parsi/Namazi Lobbying Plan

August 21, 2014 by admin

Trita Parsi coauthored a paper with Siamak Namazi on the importance of bringing Iranian-Americans into the political process to “mend the differences and misperceptions between Iran and the United States,” which they delivered at a conference in Cypress in November 1999.[1]

The paper discusses the Iranian-America demographics, their participation as cultural ambassadors between both nations, and value of increased communications and travel.

They recommended setting up a lobbying organization in the US, patterned after the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Both Parsi and Siamak oppose economic sanctions and urged an “increased awareness” among Iranian-Americans on the “counterproductive aspects of a confrontational sanctions policy.” They said it was important for Iranian-Americans to engage “in the debate on the future of Iran-US relations,” which they described as “a rational approach to Iran,” and not the same as “support for the regime in Iran.”[2]

What is most interesting about the paper is the near absence of any negative information about the Iranian regime and its long history of repression and violence against its citizenry. There are reasons the mullahs’ regime has been described as “evil” and the “most active state sponsor of terrorism,” issues completely avoided in the paper.

Parsi and Namazi describe Iranian expats who fled the totalitarian regime as “handicapped” because of their first-hand knowledge of the regime. Expat children, they then explain, “do not carry the same emotional burdens that stand in the way of fully adapting to a new country and culture.”[3] Thus, knowing less about Iran and its vile ways is advantageous to improving relations with regime.

The Parsi/Namazi paper attacks the People’s Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK), which has long been the main opposition group advocating the replacement of the regime with a democratic government. Parsi and Namazi said involving more Iranian-Americans in the US political process “could do a lot in the way of ostracizing the MKO.”[4]

Parsi and Namazi highlight the high level of trade between Iran and the US in 1991 ($760 billion) and its subsequent decline after sanctions were applied. They avoid any discussion on the reasons sanctions were imposed. The day President Clinton signed the sanctions bill into law in 1996, he said, “You cannot do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night.”[5]

That the paper by Parsi and Namazi presents a false and misleading view of the Iranian regime is no surprise given their links to the mullahs.

The conference where they presented their paper was sponsored by the Centre of World Dialogue and by Hamyaran, an Iranian NGO established by Siamak’s father, Baquer, and an Iranian deputy minister.[6] The NGO oversees all contacts between international organizations and Iran’s NGOs to ensure they do not step out of line.[7]

Baquer reportedly made the arrangements for Parsi and Siamak to attend the conference, which was organized to promote pathways to improve US-Iranian relations and remove the economic sanctions.[8] In reality, it was a propaganda platform for the mullahs and a means to promote their foreign policy goals.

[1] “Iran-Americans: The Bridge between Two Nations,” Siamak Namazi & Trita Parsi, presented at the Dialogue and Action Between the People of Iran and America (DAPIA) Conference, Cyprus, November 1999.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Clinton Signs Bill Against Investing in Iran and Libya,” New York Times, August 6, 1996.

[6] The conference was called “Dialogue and Action Amongst the People of Iran and America.”

[7] Ibid.

[8] The conference was title “Developing Links between Iran and the United States.” See “Iran’s Web of Influence in US,” by Hassan Daioleslam, FrontPageMag.com, August 4, 2008.

Read more about NIAC:

Bogus Memberships & Supporters
Survey
Lobbying
Iranians for International Cooperation
Defamation Lawsuit
People’s Mojahedin
Trita Parsi Biography
Parsi Links to Namazi & Iranian Regime
Namazi, NIAC Ringleader
Collaborating with Iran’s Ambassador